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Introduction 
 
 Recent years have seen the rise of new public school options in many of 
America’s metropolitan areas.1  Privately run charter schools, magnet schools that draw 
their attendees not only from different municipalities but also different neighborhoods, 
and open enrollment plans that allow children to attend school in another public school 
district entirely are changing the face of public education in America.  The neighborhood 
public school, which long defined both the primary and secondary educational experience 
for most Americans, has become only one of many options available. 
 Reforms in the urban public education system have come in response to dismay 
about the decline in urban public school quality, as well as the legal and social pressure 
generated by the increasing segregation of low-income, minority students in city public 
schools.  Policy attacks on segregation have focused on two main fronts: on school 
segregation itself, with attacks on the system of neighborhood-based schools as 
perpetuating racial separation, and on the underlying problem of residential segregation 
that creates segregated schools through neighborhood-based assignments.2 
 Historically, housing integration–oriented policies have been based on the 
assumption that minority and poor households would, if given the choice, prefer 
integration by class and race.  For example, both the Fair Housing Act and tenant-based 
Section 8, the two most significant and long-standing federal policies designed to foster 
housing integration and an increase in housing options for poor and minority families, 
                                                 
1 See Heritage Foundation, School Choice: Greater Opportunities in Education, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/education/schoolchoice/schoolchoice.cfm (last visited May 8, 2007) 
(discussing current status of school choice in each state); Heritage Foundation, School Choice: Types of 
School Choice, http://www.heritage.org/research/education/schoolchoice/typesofschoolchoice.cfm (last 
visited May 8, 2007) (detailing various forms of school choice). 
2 See infra Part I. 
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can only serve an integrative purpose if prospective tenants and homebuyers make the 
choice to integrate—that is, to move into a neighborhood inhabited primarily by 
individuals of a different race and/or social class.3  By contrast, school choice programs 
have frequently permitted only one-way integrative choices—for example, by only 
allowing minorities or whites to move to a school with a smaller percentage of minorities 
or whites, respectively, than their current school—yet participation in such programs 
generally remains voluntary and success remains dependent on parents choosing to 
integrate.4 
The realities of individual preference, economics, and social pressure reflect a 
much more complicated dynamic than the assumptions behind these programs would 
suggest.  The results of school choice policies in Connecticut provide a window into 
these complications.  Like an increasing number of American states and localities, 
Connecticut has begun to experiment with voluntary cross-boundary school choice 
options, including the creation of schools in the city that both city and suburban residents 
                                                 
3 The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal for housing providers to discriminate in the provision of housing to 
otherwise qualified renters or purchasers on various grounds including race, but does not require housing 
providers to affirmatively integrate their housing, nor does it require renters or purchasers to affirmatively 
seek out integrated housing opportunities.  Even if housing providers fully complied with the letter and 
spirit of the Act, the Act’t integrative potential would still depend on the voluntary efforts of tenants and 
homebuyers. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 et seq. (2000); Thaddeus J. Hackworth, Note, The 
Ghetto Prison: Federal Policy Responses to Racial and Economic Segregation, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 181, 181-82 (2005).  Section 8 provides vouchers that subsidize rental housing to a limited 
number of eligible applicants; within the significant limitations of applicants’ financial means and the 
willingness of landlords to accept the vouchers, applicants may choose where to live. See U.S. Housing Act 
of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq. (2000); Brian Maney & Sheila Crowley, Scarcity and 
Success: Perspectives on Assisted Housing, 9-SUM J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 319, 
325-329 (2000). 
4 See Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
791 (2005).  Not all programs that send children to schools other than the one in their neighborhood have 
been voluntary.  Under court-ordered busing plans in the 1970s and 80s, many families had no choice in 
which public school their children attended, as children were bused out of their neighborhood to achieve 
racial balance in schools.  In most cases, this program was enormously unpopular.  See infra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
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attend.5  Enrollment data from the first decade of cross-boundary school choice options in 
Connecticut demonstrates that city and suburban white and African-American residents 
exercise their choices in different ways.  In enacting the programs, policymakers assumed 
that creating special city magnet schools with places set aside for suburban residents 
would result in a flow of white, middle-class students into these schools.6  Conventional 
scholarly wisdom, taking for granted that families of all races migrate from the city to the 
suburbs in large part to gain access to suburban educational opportunities, would have 
predicted that the programs would have few suburban participants from any racial group.7  
Neither side was correct.  Instead, suburban African-American families have chosen to 
participate in large numbers; in particular, as compared with whites in the same districts, 
blacks living in heavily white suburban districts are much more likely than blacks who 
live in more integrated suburban districts to use choice to move their children into a more 
heavily minority school.  Furthermore, across both wealthy and poorer suburbs, whites 
are exercising choice at much lower rates than blacks, and whites’ exercise of choice to 
leave a suburban district is correlated with the poverty level of the children in that 
district’s schools.8  As a result, these programs generate outcomes, and have certain 
benefits and downsides, expected neither by their supporters nor their opponents. 
These findings, while perhaps surprising to some, are consistent with and 
contribute to a growing literature about the complex attitudes held by many African-
Americans towards integration, especially when “integration” means being a token 
                                                 
5 See infra Section I.C. 
6 See An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and Opportunities, 1997 Conn. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act. 97-290 
(West) (setting out methods and rationales); Stan Simpson, A Decade of Half Measures: 10 Years After a 
Hartford Mother and Son Forced City Schools To Integrate, Progress Has Dragged, HARTFORD COURANT, 
July 23, 2006 (offering an extensive discussion of what policies have sought and what they have achieved). 
7 See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra Part II. 
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African-American in a predominantly white environment.  As Sheryll Cashin points out, 
in an American system where opportunity is shaped by the racial and economic 
composition of the neighborhood in which one lives, blacks have recognized and even 
accepted that getting access to opportunity has required some amount of integration.9  On 
the other hand, Cashin explains, “[M]any black people appear to have adopted a ‘post-
integrationist’ mind-set, and now most value living among themselves . . . .”10  This 
mind-set appears to be rooted in at least two partially contradictory sources: first, 
frustration with integration’s “unmet promises” that has motivated many blacks to look 
beyond integration, and second, the fall of certain discriminatory barriers that has allowed 
blacks to express a preference for living among other blacks, to acquiesce in “to the 
fundamentally human tendency to seek community among people who are familiar to 
us.”11  The resulting development of black suburbs also has a dark side, however: even 
the wealthiest suburban black communities have not achieved the benefits of similarly 
situated white suburbs, including good job opportunities and good schools.12 
Cashin’s work suggests that clustering may have an intuitive appeal as a partial 
explanation for the persistence of racial segregation in America.  Yet measuring the 
degree to which clustering explains residential racial segregation—or its harms and 
benefits—has proven difficult, because it co-exists with continued housing discrimination 
and social class segregation in the housing market.  Experiments such as Moving to 
Opportunity have attempted to assess the degree to which clustering explains racial 
segregation in American society, by studying how low-income families exercise housing 
                                                 
9 SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM, at xvi-xvii (2004). 
10 Id. at 17. 
11 Id. at 12, 25. 
12 Id. at 134-35. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 6
choices when given restricted and unrestricted vouchers.13  Moving to Opportunity gave 
certain low-income minority residents of city public housing portable housing vouchers 
that allowed them to move anywhere; many individuals remained in areas with 
significant black populations, suggesting the force of clustering.14  The program gave 
another group of public housing residents housing vouchers that could only be used in 
low-poverty neighborhoods.15  Contrary to expectations that on a variety of indicators, 
participating children would be better off having moved to wealthier neighborhoods, 
researchers were surprised to find that those male teenagers who moved to wealthier 
areas actually did worse than male teenage members of the control group on thirteen out 
of fifteen indicators designed to track physical health, mental health, risky behavior, and 
education.16  Moving to Opportunity calls into question the conventional assumption that 
                                                 
13 Moving to Opportunity grew out of the Gautreaux program in Chicago and is designed to test the effects 
of restricted and unrestricted housing mobility on poor families’ well-being.  In the initial set of studies, 
participants, all of whom started as project-based public housing residents, were divided into three 
categories: the first group received Section 8 vouchers enabling them to move anywhere, the second 
received vouchers enabling them to move only to low-poverty areas (census tracts with less than 10% of 
the population living below the FPL), and the third (control) group remains in public housing and does not 
receive vouchers at all.  See John Goering, Judith D. Feins, & Todd M. Richardson, A Cross-Site Analysis 
of Initial Moving to Opportunity Demonstration Results, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 1, 4-5 (2002); MTO Program 
Design, http://www.nber.org/~kling/mto/background.htm#Design (last visited May 9, 2007).  Members of 
three groups are then studied along a variety of economic and noneconomic indicators to assess their well-
being and the power of such vouchers to have a positive impact on participants’ lives.  Id. 
14 See Goering, Feins, & Richardson, supra note 13, at 16 tbl.4 (noting that on average, MTO families 
receiving unrestricted Section 8 vouchers lived in neighborhoods that were 40.3% black, as compared with 
neighborhoods that were 48.3% black inhabited by the control group that did not receive vouchers). Moving 
to Opportunity could not definitively answer how much an affirmative desire to cluster shapes these 
families’ choices; negative factors such as trouble accessing housing, unfamiliarity with other 
neighborhoods, discrimination from neighborhood residents, and discrimination in attempting to use the 
vouchers, may limit the ability of minorities to move into different neighborhoods despite having the 
newfound economic wherewithal to do so.  It did find, however, that MTO participants who moved to 
lower-poverty areas did not experience “substantial, direct racial hostility” or “community opposition” in 
their new location.  Goering, Feins, & Richardson, supra note 13, at 12-13. 
15 See id. at 4-5. 
16 Jeffrey R. Kling, Jeffrey B. Liebman, & Lawrence F. Katz, Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood 
Effects, 75 ECONOMETRICA 83, 90-91, 103 (2007) 
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simply placing a low-income, minority student—particularly a male teenager—in a 
wealthier school will be beneficial for him.17 
This study seeks to build upon the Moving to Opportunity research with a goal 
towards further understanding how parents make choices about their children’s schooling 
in light of the dynamics that Cashin and Moving to Opportunity have identified.  To 
better understand these dynamics, this study focuses on two interdistrict choice-based 
programs in Connecticut.18  In particular, an examination of the rates of enrollment by 
racial group in New Haven’s interdistrict magnet schools helps answer some of the 
questions that the housing-based experiments leave unanswered.  The unique 
configuration of these schools, which this paper discusses in detail, facilitates an almost 
natural experiment through which to examine the way clustering dynamics may affect 
where students, in a choice-based system, end up going to school.  In focusing on schools 
as opposed to focusing on housing, this study hopes to contribute to current discussions 
on urban school policy, which nationwide continues to be in rapid flux.19 
This paper proceeds in four parts.  Part I situates the paper in its historical and 
social context.  It discusses the evolution of urban education and school choice in 
America since 1970, with a focus on the development of interdistrict school choice in 
Connecticut and how school choice operates today.  Part II offers a detailed exposition of 
                                                 
17 See id.; see also Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2375, 2389 (“[S]hipping black children to predominantly white environments has often proven 
detrimental to their well-being.”). 
18 One program has created publicly-funded schools, known as “interdistrict magnet schools,” that are 
located in the city but enroll students from multiple school districts.  The other program, known in 
Connecticut as Open Choice and generically as open enrollment, allows students from one school district or 
municipality to enroll in the public schools operated by another district.  In Connecticut, in contrast with 
most other states, students can only transfer between urban and suburban districts; transfers between 
suburban districts are not permitted through the program. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
19 In the context of cross-boundary or location-oriented policies, a focus on school policy also seems 
particularly important because, as Moving to Opportunity has aptly pointed out, it is the teenage youth 
population that is most at risk from the adverse effects of their environment.  See Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 
supra note 16, at 103. 
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the cross-boundary school choice options in New Haven, the Connecticut city that 
pioneered Connecticut’s unique experiment in creating interdistrict schools.  It explores 
how urban and suburban families exercise school choice options and reveals the 
surprising extent to which suburban black families, particularly those in districts where 
they are token in numbers, have chosen to send their children to magnet schools at rates 
much higher than those of similarly situated whites.  Part III explores means of 
evaluating New Haven’s cross-boundary programs and the lessons these programs can 
offer educational policy innovators.  Drawing on frameworks from law and economics, 
social capital, and political economy, it assesses the normative implications and political 
feasibility of cross-boundary programs along a variety of dimensions.  Part IV concludes. 
 
I. The Development of School Choice 
 For over a century, most Americans never thought of sending their children to any 
school other than the public school that served their place of residence.  Though private 
schools have existed in America for centuries, the neighborhood public school, as 
homogenous as one’s residential neighborhood, defined the primary, and sometimes, the 
secondary educational experience for most living Americans who came of age before 
1970.20  These public schools varied tremendously in quality along many dimensions, 
with racial divisions frequently tracking quality divisions.  Where whites may remember 
an almost edenic ideal of a safe, welcoming, warm environment, blacks may recall a 
                                                 
20 See MEYER WEINBERG, RACE AND PLACE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL (1967). 
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dilapidated physical plant, large classes, textbook shortages, and other results of chronic 
underfunding.21 
Starting around 1970, in the wake of several seminal Supreme Court decisions, 
federal courts began to order many large city school districts to bus a portion of their 
students to schools outside their neighborhoods—what critics called “forced busing”—as 
a means of integrating city schools.22  In affected city districts, busing signaled the end of 
neighborhood schools for a significant portion of district residents, at least until the 
decrees began to be lifted in the 1980s and 1990s.23  Yet even in the early 1970s, it had 
already become apparent that achieving truly integrated schools would require mixing 
children from the city and the suburbs, since an ever-increasing portion of metropolitan 
areas’ white student populations was moving to suburbs, leaving behind an increasingly 
                                                 
21 See id.; see also Mark S. Davies, Desegregating an Ideal: Neighborhood Schools, Urban School Systems, 
and Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 89 (1995) (arguing that judicial reasoning 
about schools assumes a particular image of a suburban neighborhood school).  Reflecting common usage, 
throughout this paper, I employ the terms “black” and “African-American” interchangeably.  With regard 
to classifications in the data, for school enrollment-related data, I have relied on the Connecticut 
Department of Education’s single-race classification system, which classifies each student as white, black, 
Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian, and does not provide for a multi-race category.  I also employ data 
from the 2000 and earlier censuses, which employs a somewhat different system of racial classification.  In 
particular, the census treats “Hispanic origin” as a binary (yes/no) variable separate from one’s race (white, 
black, Asian, etc.), and as of 2000, allows individuals to self-identify as being members of more than one 
racial group.  For simplicity and in order to make the Census and Department of Education data more 
directly comparable, with regard to Census data I have considered those individuals of Hispanic origin, 
regardless of race, as “Hispanic.”  “White” refers to non-Hispanics who identify as white alone.  “Black” 
generally refers to non-Hispanics who identify as black alone, although in a few cases data for non-
Hispanic blacks was not separately available, in which case “black” refers to all who identify as black 
alone.  Because the Department of Education data does not include a multi-race category, to aid 
comparison, those non-Hispanics who identify as being of more than one race are not included in the 
analysis.  This should not affect results too greatly: census data is generally only used for background; only 
rarely do I directly compare numbers from the Department of Education and Census; and in the 2000 
Census, only 2.4% of New Haven non-Hispanic residents (1.5% of the New Haven region’s non-Hispanic 
residents) indicated being members of more than one race. 
22 The first Supreme Court decision to approve mandatory busing was Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
School Dist., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).  Controversies over busing raged in many cities, most famously and 
intensely in Boston.  For a good portrayal of the Boston busing controversy that situates it in a broader 
national and historical context, see RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND 
ETHNICITY IN THE 1960S AND 1970S (2004). 
23 See GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION (1996) (describing the history and end of 
desegregation decrees). 
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concentrated poor and minority student population in the city.24  Reformers in Detroit 
convinced a federal court to require suburban districts to participate in a metropolitan 
area–wide desegregation plan.25  The incensed suburban districts protested that they 
should not have been obligated to help desegregate Detroit’s schools, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court agreed in Milliken v. Bradley.26  In holding that a federal court could not 
implement a multidistrict school desegregation remedy absent a finding that the 
constitutional violation in one district produced segregation in the other, or that the 
school district boundary lines were established with the purpose of fostering racial 
segregation, the Supreme Court signaled that federal judicial remedies for school 
desegregation would stop at the city line.27 
 Milliken reflected and rested on two primary principles embedded in our 
constitutional tradition.  First, it stood on the principle of federalism, reflecting a 
longstanding tradition of local and state control over education.  Second, it reflected the 
principle that the judiciary’s power to order a remedy against a particular actor stems 
from that actor’s commission of a legal violation.28  The Court’s holding reflected the 
majority’s understanding of both of these principles.  In particular, it codified the legal 
relevance of school district boundaries rather than yielding to the respondents’ suggestion 
that the Court recognize them as an artificial, historically contingent product with 
detrimental effects: 
[T]he notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere 
administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our 
                                                 
24 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 759-62 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
25 See Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff’d in relevant part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th 
Cir. 1973), rev’d, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
26 418 U.S. 717. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 741-43. 
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country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought 
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public 
schools and to quality of the educational process.29 
 
The Court cited no empirical evidence for its reasoning that local autonomy of school 
districts enhanced the quality of the educational process, nor did it discuss the means by 
which the quality was so enhanced.  Yet the majority drew upon the American cultural 
notion of the neighborhood school and local school district, instinctually reasoning that 
local autonomy and school quality were somehow related. 
Reading the majority opinion’s text, Milliken seems like an unremarkable 
decision: absent a finding that the suburban districts had themselves engaged in racial 
discrimination, a court could not enforce a remedial order against them.  But the social 
and practical effect of the decision was dramatic; it “dealt a crushing blow” to efforts at 
urban desegregation in the growing number of northern and western municipalities where 
school district and town lines divided whites from minorities.30  In the over thirty years 
since the Milliken decision, the majority’s understanding that school quality depends on 
local autonomy has expanded its powerful hold over the American educational system.  
As James Ryan has pointed out, Milliken not only reflected but also enhanced the 
political power of suburbanites to maintain local control over their schools.31 
 
A. Post-Milliken Dynamics 
 Milliken assumed a background system of state and local control over schools, 
and its converse, that one’s place of school was intricately linked to one’s place of 
                                                 
29 Id. at 741-742. 
30 James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635, 1645 (2004). 
31 Id. at 1646. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 12
residence.  A year before Milliken, the U.S. Supreme Court had decided San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, holding that unequal school financing within a 
state based on differences in local property tax revenues did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32  In the wake of these two decisions, 
suburbs and suburban residents could wash their hands of the problems of urban 
education as a matter of federal constitutional law.33  In explicitly endorsing a “deeply 
rooted” tradition of local control over schools, the Court signaled to white families who 
could afford to move out of the city to the then-racially homogenous suburbs that by 
doing so, they could avoid sending their children to (or contributing to the financing of) 
integrated schools.34  Transported from the city to the suburbs, the idyllic neighborhood 
school resettled into its comfortable foothold.35 
As the site of high-quality public education shifted to the suburbs, giving 
minorities access to suburban schools and the benefits that accompanied them appeared 
to require opening up suburban housing opportunities to minority residents.36  Even 
following the erosion of formal discriminatory barriers following the passage of the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, exclusionary zoning and lingering discrimination tended to keep 
                                                 
32 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
33 See Ryan, supra note 30, at 1646.  The rulings in Milliken and Rodriguez did not prevent state 
legislatures or state courts from implementing cross-boundary school attendance or redistributive school 
financing plans as a matter of state statutory or constitutional law.  For example, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court’s holding in Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), explicitly required the state to implement 
a cross-boundary remedy as a matter of state constitutional law.  See infra Section II.C.  Yet as James Ryan 
notes, as a practical matter successfully implementing cross-boundary school choice requires overcoming 
the formidable political legacy of Milliken. Ryan, supra note 30, at 1635. 
34 See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2052  
(2002) (noting that suburban schools “would remain inviolable”); cf. Liu & Taylor, supra note 4, at 792 
(2005) (noting that school segregation persists in America in part because suburbs have been largely 
immune from city-based school desegregation lawsuits since the Milliken decision in 1974). 
35 See Liu & Taylor, supra note 4, at 792 (noting that desegregation has not been tried in many suburban 
districts). 
36 Suburban residents also get the benefit of access to neighborhoods with lower crime rates, jobs, more 
expansive housing, and better government services. 
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suburban home prices high and otherwise out of reach of many minority families.37  
Furthermore, as economists have demonstrated, homes in high-quality school districts are 
relatively more expensive than similarly sized and situated homes in worse school 
districts because the value of good schools gets capitalized into home prices.38  They are 
thus particularly out of reach for low-income persons.  These phenomena led activists to 
form an “open suburbs” movement, which filed a series of housing integration lawsuits—
most famously in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey—with the goal of requiring higher-income 
suburbs to accept a “fair share” of inexpensive housing for low-income families.39 
 Yet activists likely underestimated the ferocity with which suburban homeowners 
would resist this type of imposed integration,40 and large gaps along social class lines 
remain today between cities and suburban communities in many American metropolitan 
areas.41  However, suburbs have diversified considerably along racial lines over the past 
four decades, tempering the 1960s-era vision of the lily-white suburban “noose” around 
the black central city.42  In the New Haven, Connecticut region,43 on which this paper 
                                                 
37 See Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies To 
Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 909, 909-910 (1991) (noting continued 
race discrimination in housing in spite of Fair Housing Act, and the link between housing discrimination 
and school segregation); Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning 
Law, 22 HARV. C.-R. C.-L. L. REV. 623 (1987) (discussing practice of exclusionary zoning and litigation 
against it). 
38 See infra note 236. 
39 See Christopher Berry, Land Use Regulation and Residential Segregation: Does Zoning Matter?, 3 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 251, 255 (2001) (describing “open suburbs” movement and its lack of success); 
McDougall, supra note 37 (discussing Mt. Laurel) 
40 For details of such ferocious resistance, see Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to 
Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.-R. C.-L. L. REV. 289 (2002).  Schuck contends that the litigation has 
been extremely difficult because the principle the plaintiffs attempted to vindicate in the Mt. Laurel 
litigation, “equal access to suburban communities regardless of ability to pay,” enjoys little moral or 
political support in American society. Schuck, supra, at 294. 
41 See Hackworth, supra note 3, at 185-86. 
42 As Ingrid Gould Ellen points out, the disproportionate emphasis of social science researchers on evolving 
housing patterns in cities has obscured the development of knowledge about the full extent of change in 
suburban communities. INGRID GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PROSPECTS 
FOR STABLE RACIAL INTEGRATION 65 (2000).  
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focuses, African-Americans owned homes in 89% of census tracts in 2000, as compared 
with 14% of census tracts in 1970.44  The percentage of all African-American children 
attending public schools in the region who attend school outside of the New Haven 
School District has grown over time, reaching 26.8% in 1994-95 and rising to 33.6% in 
2005-06.45  Growing numbers of Hispanics and Asian-Americans have also contributed 
to diversification in suburbia.  New Haven Hispanics have suburbanized at an even 
greater rate than African-Americans, with the percentage of the region’s Hispanic 
schoolchildren attending suburban public schools rising from 28.2% in 1994-95 to 41.8% 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 For purposes of this paper, the New Haven region includes the City of New Haven and sixteen towns 
outside of New Haven that form the greater New Haven metropolitan area.  There is no single definition of 
what towns make up the New Haven region.  The South Central Connecticut Regional Counsel of 
Government includes New Haven and fourteen suburban towns.  See South Central Regional Council of 
Governments, http://www.scrcog.org/ (last visited May 6, 2007).  In his seminal work on the evolution of 
New Haven in the twentieth century, Douglas Rae employs a narrower list of ten suburban towns when 
presenting comparative data.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END 374 tbl.11.3 
(2003).  The magnet schools actually draw students from twenty-three suburban towns, though some far-
away towns send only a handful of students.  In order to better capture the full picture of the school choice 
dynamic in the region, I have chosen to use a slightly more inclusive definition of the region than either 
Rae or the Regional Counsel, though I have not included every town in New Haven County nor the towns 
that send a handful of children to the magnet schools but would not be considered part of the New Haven 
region by anyone’s definition.  This definition includes New Haven and sixteen suburban towns: Ansonia, 
Bethany, Branford, Derby, East Haven, Guilford, Hamden, Madison, Milford, North Branford, North 
Haven, Orange, Seymour, Wallingford, West Haven, and Woodbridge.  Note that in Connecticut, school 
district boundaries never bisect town boundaries, and are essentially coterminous except in the few cases 
where several towns have joined together to form a regional school district.  The New Haven region has 
one such district—Regional District Number 5—which includes the towns of Bethany, Orange, and 
Woodbridge for grades 7-12 only.  Every other town operates its own, autonomous school district. 
44 Census 2000 data was generated using customized tables from “Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 
100-Percent Data,” available at U.S. Census Bureau, United States--Data Sets--American FactFinder, 
http:// factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (follow “get data” hyperlink under “Decennial 
Census” heading) (last visited May. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Census 2000 Data].   Census 1970 data was 
generated using customized tables from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), contained in 
Geolytics, Census DVD Research Package.  Census tracts comprise about 1,500 to 8,000 people each and 
are the best analogue to a “neighborhood” available from census data.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 
Tracts and Block Numbering Areas, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cen_tract.html (last visited May 8, 
2007).  My thanks to Adam Gordon for originally making me aware of this dramatic shift. 
45 Data calculated from Connecticut State Department of Education, Connecticut Strategic School Profiles, 
Strategic School Profiles by District 1993-94, available at 
http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/der/ssp/Dist9394/district.htm [hereinafter Connecticut 1993-94 District 
SSP], and Connecticut State Department of Education, Connecticut Strategic School Profiles, Strategic 
Profiles by District 2005-06, available at http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/der/ssp/dist0506/district.htm 
[hereinafter Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP] 
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in 2005-06.46  Though these figures mean that around two-thirds of the region’s African-
American children still attend school in the city, this dramatic shift in suburban 
composition cannot be ignored.  Though economic barriers to integration remain 
significant, American society has progressed significantly since the era of legally-
enforceable racial covenants in many northern cities and suburbs in the first half of the 
twentieth century.47 
Yet the removal of non-economic barriers to suburban entry has provided little 
comfort for the vast majority of America’s minority families, for whom stark economic 
realities remain.  Even following a widely-hailed decade of success in combating poverty, 
in 1999 the national poverty rate for black families was 24.9%, for Hispanic families 
22.6%, and for non-Hispanic whites only 8.1%.48  These divisions have played out in 
where children go to school, with urban public schools educating most of the low-income 
and minority children in American metropolitan areas, and suburban schools educating an 
increasingly diverse but generally wealthier population of whites and some minorities.49 
 
B. Development of New Types of Urban Schools 
Besides pursuing opportunities to enable minorities to move to the suburbs, 
reformers continued their efforts to improve urban schools, particularly as white flight led 
                                                 
46 Data calculated from Connecticut 1993-94 District SSP and Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra 
note 45. The percentage of white students (around 95%) and of students overall (around 75%) attending 
public school in the region outside the New Haven School District has remained largely unchanged since 
1994-95. Data calculated from Connecticut 1993-94 District SSP and Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, 
supra note 45. 
47 The Supreme Court held racial covenants legally unenforceable in 1948. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948).  Apparently, residents of the New Haven region never employed racial covenants, the use of which 
was widespread in many other northern cities.  But across the metropolitan area, blacks remained 
concentrated in a few city neighborhoods until recent years, as discussed above. 
48 Census 2000 Data, supra note 44, reprinted in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 1999, at 8 tbl.6 (2003). 
49 New Haven is no exception to this trend; for specific details, see infra text accompanying notes 134-137. 
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to them serving increasingly poor and minority populations.  Once it became clear that in 
the wake of Milliken, Rodriguez, and the phenomenon of white suburbanization that 
future federal court lawsuits of the kind popular in the aftermath of Brown would have 
limited effect, reformers turned to state court litigation under the provisions of state 
constitutions and statutes.  This litigation has evolved through several types of claims, 
including equal protection claims that focus on comparative school financing disparities 
and gaps in per-pupil expenditures and quality of facilities, adequacy-based claims that 
focus specifically on the need to improve failing schools, and most recently, isolation-
based claims that focus on the harm caused by de facto racial and economic isolation of 
poor minorities in city schools.50 
At the same time, policymakers and activists outside of the judicial realm began 
to articulate other solutions for the problems of failing city schools.  In the years since 
Milliken, as cities have become increasingly minority and low-income, reformers have 
experimented with new types of schools or assignment plans, designed to balance goals 
of maintaining high-quality schools, keeping white families in the system, and staying 
financially afloat.51  Over the past two decades, these reforms have increasingly taken 
place in the form of “school choice.”52  Urban districts started themed magnet schools 
that drew their population from across the city as an experiment in diversifying and in 
providing a higher-quality educational experience that would be attractive to both white 
                                                 
50 See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999); Aaron Saiger, Note, 
Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830, 
1832 (1999). 
51 See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, Parents Involved and Meredith: A Prediction Regarding the 
(Un)constitutionality of Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 310-318 
(2006) (discussing programs that public school districts have voluntary implemented to remedy 
segregation). 
52 See id.   
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and minority city residents.53  As early as 1980, Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
Montclair, New Jersey, experimented with disestablishing neighborhood schools in favor 
of a district-wide choice plan.54  Minnesota pioneered cross-district choice with a 
statewide cross-district choice plan beginning with the 1990-91 school year.55 
Choice-based reforms got a boost with the publication of John Chubb and Terry 
Moe’s Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools in 1990.56  Though many of their ideas 
had been previously articulated in other places and forms, the book’s publication 
heralded a turning point in thinking about solutions to the crisis in public schools.57  
Proclaiming that schools did better when principals and teachers had autonomy, they 
concluded that the existing system of bureaucratized public schools actually harmed 
school quality by limiting the autonomy of principals and teachers.58  Though lawsuits 
continued to claim that funding disparities were the cause of poor schools, Chubb and 
Moe argued that money was not the only cause.59  Drawing on ideas first articulated by 
Milton Friedman, they hypothesized that the competition created by public school options 
would lead to dramatic educational improvements.60  Pointing to various experiments 
already in place, their argument that school choice would strengthen schools through 
                                                 
53 See Kimberly C. West, Note, A Desegregation Tool That Backfired, 103 YALE L.J. 2567, 2568-2571 
(1994) (describing history, purpose, and functioning of magnet schools) 
54 See JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 111-12 
(1994); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH 
PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 116-30 (2001); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT, 
CREATING STRONG DISTRICT SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS 41 (2004) (discussing the Cambridge plan). 
55 Ross Corson, Choice Ironies: Open Enrollment in Minnesota, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 21, 1990; 
Robert C. Bulman & David L. Kirp, The Shifting Politics of School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND 
SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 36, 45 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer, 
eds. 1999) (noting Minnesota was first place to enact open enrollment).  Other states put similar plans into 
effect during the 1990s. 
56 JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990) 
57 See Bulman & Kirp, supra note 55, at 45-46. 
58 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 56, at 23, 187. 
59 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 56, at 193. 
60 See BRIAN P. GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 116-117 (2001) (discussing history of school choice). 
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creation of a competitive market set off a nationwide debate about the benefits that school 
choice might provide to problem districts, and a scramble to implement experiments.61 
Implementation of choice-based school reforms, primarily by legislative initiative, 
accelerated through the 1990s and into the first decade of the twentieth century.62  An 
extensive scholarly literature particularly focuses on the merits of charter schools and 
vouchers as school-choice options.  Yet while the link between one’s neighborhood of 
residence and where one goes to school has continued to erode as a result of choice-based 
reforms, those programs that are perhaps the most radical form of choice—“cross-
boundary” programs that permit students living in one district to attend school in, and/or 
with students from, another district—remain relatively undiscussed in the scholarly 
literature.  Though they constitute just one category among the ever-expanding menu of 
“choice” schools, they continue to expand across the country and deserve serious 
consideration. 
 
C. The Development of Interdistrict School Choice in Connecticut 
Though it has not implemented open enrollment to the same extent as some other 
states, Connecticut has been at the national forefront in implementing cross-boundary 
school choice plans focused on providing better educational opportunities for low-income 
and minority students.  In particular, Connecticut has created a new kind of cross-
boundary school choice option—the interdistrict magnet school.  Interdistrict school 
choice arose in Connecticut as the result of a lawsuit, Sheff v. O’Neill, and was ultimately 
                                                 
61 See Bulman & Kirp, supra note 55, at 45-46 (explaining that the policy world was eager to have a 
panacea at the time Chubb and Moe first contended that choice represented a panacea). 
62 See Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School Choice, in SCHOOL 
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW supra note 55, at 13, 21 (noting that 
school choice has been growing nationally since 1990). 
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implemented by legislative initiative.63  Litigated by a creative team of lawyers in 
Connecticut state court, Sheff remains the most path-breaking and novel case of the latest 
wave of education lawsuits.64  Most previous court-ordered remedies to education 
lawsuits had taken a district’s background composition for granted and focused on 
increasing funding for city schools, or had sought to implement some form of intradistrict 
choice to diversify schools.  In most cases, they limited their remedies to the boundaries 
of the city school district.65 
The Sheff plaintiffs charged that Connecticut’s system of distinct urban and 
suburban school districts itself violated the state constitutional rights of children isolated 
in the Hartford school system.  Breaking with the pattern of previous lawsuits, the 
plaintiffs contended the source of educational inadequacy came not only from funding 
disparities, but also from the ethnic, racial, and economic isolation of students in 
Connecticut’s urban school districts.66  The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed that 
isolation was the root of the harm.67  The Court went on to conclude that though federal 
constitutional law would provide no remedy in this situation, the “unique provisions” and 
“constitutional imperatives” of the Connecticut Constitution entitled the plaintiffs to 
relief.68  In its holding, the Connecticut Supreme Court explicitly broke with the tradition 
of Milliken.  Where the U.S. Supreme Court twenty years before had looked to the 
“deeply rooted” belief in local control and the need for “local autonomy” to ensure public 
                                                 
63 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).  For a vivid chronicle of the history of the Sheff case and 
the poor quality schools in the Hartford School District that inspired the case, see SUSAN EATON, THE 
CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL (2007). 
64 See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
65 See Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2050-58. 
66 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271-72.  Racial isolation is commonly cited as one of America’s most serious, 
but also most intractable, social problems.  See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 40, at 303. 
67 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1270-71. 
68 Id. at 1270-71. 
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support for public schools and educational quality, the Connecticut Supreme Court found 
that the Connecticut constitutional right to “a substantially equal educational 
opportunity”69 required the legislature to take affirmative steps to remedy de facto 
segregation in public schools, even if it meant violating the sanctity of district lines.70 
The Sheff Court was the first modern state court case to identify isolation, rather 
than racially discriminatory state action, as the fundamental problem afflicting minorities 
in urban schools.71  Most significantly, the court recognized that particularly in Hartford, 
a district that was 92% minority when the suit was filed in 1988-89, it would be 
impossible to achieve any sort of racial diversity absent a cross-boundary remedy.72  
Simply ordering increased funding would not be enough.  Rather than doing so itself, the 
Court ordered the legislature to develop a remedy.73  In negotiation with the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, the state began implementing cross-boundary programs in the mid-1990s, and 
agreed, in a comprehensive settlement in 2003, that at least thirty percent of minority 
Hartford residents attending public school would do so in a “racially desegregated 
setting” by June 2007.74 
                                                 
69 Id. at 1275.  Though not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution as such, the court had held in a 
previous case that three central provisions of the state constitution, when read together, impose such an 
obligation.  “[A]rticle eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, impose on the legislature an affirmative 
constitutional obligation to provide schoolchildren throughout the state with a substantially equal 
educational opportunity.” Id. at 1277 (citing Horton v. Meskill (Horton I), 172 Conn. 615, 648-49 (1977)). 
70 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1289 (accepting finding of trial court that “‘[t]he single most important factor that 
contribute[s] to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in Hartford [is] the town-school 
district system [codified at § 10-240] which has existed since 1909 . . .’” and that the effects of the school 
districting scheme made it unconstitutional). 
71 See Nick Lewin, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The Triumph of School Choice Over Racial 
Desegregation, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 129 (2005) (noting uniqueness of Sheff). 
72 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1289-91. 
73 Id. at 1290-91. 
74 Stipulation and Order, Sheff v. O’Neill, No. X03-89-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2003).  It 
appears that this goal will not be achieved. See JACK DOUGHERTY ET AL., A VISUAL GUIDE TO SHEFF V. 
O’NEILL SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 8 (2006). 
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Though the evidence presented in the lawsuit focused on Hartford, the 
legislatively-devised remedies that came out of Sheff apply to all of the state’s major 
metropolitan areas with racial disparity between the city and suburbs—principally 
Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport.75  Among Connecticut’s major cities, New Haven was 
the earliest to aggressively implement the Sheff remedies, particularly interdistrict magnet 
schools, providing an excellent case study for understanding the interdistrict dynamics 
that the remedies have fostered.76  New Haven also forms an interesting case study 
because it retains a significant white middle class population in large part due to the 
educational and employment opportunities provided by Yale University.  New Haven’s 
non-Hispanic white population constituted 35.6% of the total city population in 2000, 
larger than Bridgeport’s 30.9% and twice that of Hartford’s 17.8%.77  All three cities 
have a sizable black middle class; New Haven’s African-American population is 
wealthier than that in Hartford but not as wealthy as that in Bridgeport: 












New Haven 39.2% 26.8% 12.0% 5.2% 
Hartford 34.6% 25.2% 9.9% 5.0% 
Bridgeport 46.8% 36.2% 16.8% 7.0% 
 
                                                 
75 These remedies include two major programs: interdistrict magnet schools and Open Choice.  The original 
act implementing Sheff was entitled An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and Opportunities, 1997 Conn. 
Legis. Serv. Pub. Act. 97-290 (West).  There is also a third program designed to foster cooperation between 
existing schools in different districts. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-74d. 
76 However, Hartford has more students participating in Open Choice, and since 2003, has become more 
aggressive than in the past in creating interdistrict magnet schools as part of its obligations under the 2003 
stipulation.  See Stipulation and Order, Sheff v. O’Neill, No. X03-89-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 
2003); infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
77 Census 2000 Data, supra note 44. 
78 Census 2000: National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) data related to the population of school-
aged children was generated using customized tables from “Census 2000 School District Tabulation (STP2) 
Data,” available at U.S. Census Bureau, School District Demographics System, 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/datatools.asp (last visited May. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Census 2000 NCES 
Data]. 
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The interdistrict magnet schools comprise the largest and most rapidly growing 
part of the program.  The state legislature has created tremendous incentives for districts 
to create these schools, including funding the full costs of the purchase, conversion, or 
construction of interdistrict magnet school facilities and equipment.79  New Haven has 
created fourteen such schools, in some cases by converting already-existing schools to 
interdistrict magnets.  These schools collectively educated 3,476 New Haven residents in 
2005-06, about 15% of the New Haven school-aged population.80  While located in New 
Haven and administered by its School Board, these schools draw their populations from 
the New Haven region as a whole.  The New Haven magnet schools created under Sheff 
are interdistrict-oriented, with 70% of the spots targeted to students from New Haven, 
and 30% targeted to students from the surrounding towns.81 Students from New Haven 
and surrounding towns apply to the schools and are admitted through a lottery system, 
and do not pay to attend.82  To incentivize host districts to participate, and to ensure that 
the schools are being used to reduce “racial, ethnic, and economic isolation,” the state 
                                                 
79 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-264h.  The provision for full reimbursement ended June 30, 2003; after that date, 
the state will reimburse 95% of the cost of interdistrict magnet school construction. Id. 
80 Data calculated from data provided by New Haven Public Schools, consisting of a table of all magnet 
school attendees for 2005-06 and 2006-07 with personal identifying information redacted, including school 
attended, grade, gender, ethnicity, city of residence, and free/reduced lunch status. [hereinafter New Haven 
Magnet School Data].  About 41% of the New Haven magnet school population, 1,959 students in 2005-06, 
attended one of six magnet high schools; the remaining 2,823 students attended one of eight magnet 
schools educating students in some combination of grades K-8.  Id. For further detail, see Appendix A 
(providing details about each school, including racial and socioeconomic composition and number of city 
and suburban students). 
81 See New Haven Public Schools, Interdistrict Magnet Schools—New Haven, Connecticut, 
http://www.nhps.net/IDM/Faqs/ (last visited May 9, 2007).  In practice, actual enrollment fluctuates around 
these targets, though there is sufficient demand from both city and suburban participants to meet them.  In 
2005-06, the magnet schools enrolled 72.7% of their students from New Haven and 27.3% from the 
suburbs; in 2006-07, the magnet schools enrolled 68.5% of their students from New Haven and 31.5% from 
the suburbs.  New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
82 New Haven Public Schools, supra note 81.  In 2005-06, students from 23 suburban towns, plus New 
Haven, enrolled in New Haven magnet schools, for a total of 1,306 suburban students.  Suburban 
enrollment is largely concentrated in a few towns.  Nine of the 23 suburban towns sent fewer than 10 
students to a New Haven magnet school.  Only 5 suburban towns, plus New Haven, sent more than 40 
students each.  New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
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employs a complex funding formula based on how residentially and racially diverse a 
population the school enrolls.83  The state funds transportation for the suburban 
students,84 but in most cases suburban districts pay an additional $2000 to $5000 per 
student to the host district to cover the costs of educating that district’s residents.85 The 
suburban set-aside is meant to help fulfill Sheff’s purpose of ending ethnic, racial, and 
socioeconomic isolation in city schools, while New Haven’s choice to restrict suburban 
attendees to around 30% of the school population ensures that the bulk of the 
beneficiaries of the program will be New Haven residents. 
                                                 
83 To receive state funding, magnet schools cannot enroll more than 80% of their students (75% for those 
that begin operations on or after July 1, 2005) from a single school district. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-261l(a).  
Those that begin operations on or after July 1, 2005 must also maintain a white population between 25% 
and 75%.  Id. If they violate these rules they are ineligible to receive an operating grant from the state, but 
this provision can be waived for good cause for one year only. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-261l(b).  Schools 
are eligible to receive a percentage of a state “foundation” grant, currently set at $5,891 per student, based 
on how residentially diverse a population the school enrolls. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-262f(9) & 10-
261l(c)(1).  For each student from a district that constitutes less than 30% of the school’s enrollment, the 
school gets 90% of the grant.  For each student from a district that constitutes more than 30% but less than 
60% of the school’s enrollment, the school gets a percentage between 60% and 90% of the grant, varying in 
inverse proportion as the percentage of students rises.  For each student from a district that constitutes more 
than 60% but less than 90% of the school’s enrollment, the school gets a percentage between 0% and 60% 
of the grant, varying in inverse proportion as the percentage of students rises.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-
261l(c)(1).  Participating suburban districts also pay tuition for their students in an amount varying from 
$2000 to $5000 annually per student.  See infra note 85 and accompanying text.  The balancing of annual 
funding for the school is provided from the standard school revenues available to the hosting district, 
including locally-raised and state-provided revenue; construction and equipment costs, as well as 
transportation of suburban students, is separately funded by the state as discussed below. 
84 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-264i(a) (requiring state to give town of student residence actual costs, up to 
$1,300 per student, for transporting or providing for transportation of students to interdistrict magnet 
schools in another town); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-261l(f) (requiring districts housing interdistrict magnet 
schools to provide transportation to students resident in that district on same terms in which it provides 
transportation to other public school students). 
85 See DAVID MACDONALD, THE FUNDING OF INTERDISTRICT MAGNET SCHOOLS IN CONNECTICUT: A 
FAILED APPROACH TO ADDRESSING THE SHEFF V. O’NEILL CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT RULING? 11 
(2005), available at 
http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/wsd/educationfunding/Magnet_School_Policy_Analysis.pdf (citing 
Connecticut Office of Fiscal Analysis, OFA Fiscal Note on sSB-1311 (2005), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/fn/2005SB-01311-R00-FN.htm); see also In Our Towns: Magnet School 
Tuition OK’d, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 14, 2007, at B2 (discussing annual tuition at several Hartford 
area magnet schools ranging from $2080 to $3275). 
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The Open Choice program, though serving only about one-tenth the number of 
students as the magnet schools, also continues to grow.86  Modeled on an earlier, smaller 
program in Hartford, Open Choice enables a limited number of New Haven residents to 
attend suburban public schools at no cost.87  Run by a non-profit “regional service center” 
and funded by a state grant, the program coordinates placements, supports enrolled 
students, and provides state-funded transportation to school for each out-of-district 
attendee (at a cost of up to $2,100 annually per student).88  Like the magnet schools, 
Open Choice is also structured to incentivize districts to participate.  Both the sending 
and receiving districts receive 50% of the general state aid (“ECS grant”) they would 
otherwise receive for a resident student; each receiving district receives an extra $2000 
annually per student it accepts in the program;89 and districts receive a bonus of $350,000 
                                                 
86 Data calculated from data provided by Area Cooperative Educational Services, which administers the 
Open Choice program for the New Haven Region, consisting of a table of all open choice attendees for 
every year of the program, with personal identifying information redacted, including school attended, 
grade, sex, race, city and zip code of residence, home language, special services received, year student 
entered the program, past schools attended through the Open Choice program, and free/reduced lunch 
status. [hereinafter Open Choice Data]. 
87 CONNECTICUT STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE IN CONNECTICUT 2007-
2008: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 34 (2007), available at 
http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/equity/choice/schoolchoice2007.pdf.  Open Choice also enables 
suburban residents to attend non-magnet New Haven public schools, though this is a much smaller 
component of the program.  See Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
88 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266aa(e)-(f). The statute provides for the appropriation of state-funded 
transportation for participating students at an average annual cost of up to $2,100 per student, with the 
potential for extra funds if needed. Id. 
89 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266aa(h).  In the aggregate, about half of the general funding for traditional 
public schools in Connecticut comes from the state while the other half comes from local property taxes.  
General state funding for traditional public schools is calculated through a complex formula known as 
“Education Cost Sharing” (ECS), which determines the percentage of the aforementioned “foundation” that 
a district receives.  Basically, the amount of ECS aid a town gets is inversely proportional to the amount a 
town’s “wealth” falls below a statutorily set minimum.  (Those towns whose wealth is above the minimum 
do not receive a grant).  The “wealth” calculation starts from the town’s total property valuation and then is 
adjusted based on the town’s per capita and median household income relative to that of the wealthiest 
town in the state.  There is additional weighting based on the number of needy students.  The statutory 
minimum is set at 1.55 times the state median town’s wealth.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-262f to 10-
262j; see also Robert Brewer, Connecticut State Department of Education, Report Prepared for the 
National Center for Education Statistics, at 6-7, http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/pdf/StFinance/Connecti.pdf.  There 
is separate state funding for transportation, special education, and various other programs, as well as for 
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for every school in the district that enrolls ten or more Open Choice students.90  Governor 
M. Jodi Rell has proposed significant increases in state financing for both the interdistrict 
magnet schools and Open Choice program.91 
Due to their extensive state funding, significant set-asides for suburban students, 
and innovative new schools, Connecticut’s interdistrict magnet schools are largely unique 
on the American educational landscape.  While a growing number of American 
jurisdictions feature interdistrict school transfer options like Open Choice, few of these 
programs are as explicitly focused on school integration as Connecticut’s plan is.92  Other 
states’ programs, for example, frequently allow children to transfer among suburban 
districts.  Most programs leave the provision of transportation up to the individual family; 
though a growing number will reimburse low-income families for the cost of 
transportation, the logistical and financial barriers in accessing these programs can 
remain prohibitive without funded transportation.93  These programs generally feature 
                                                                                                                                                 
special programs in Connecticut’s fourteen neediest “priority districts, ” including New Haven.  See 
Brewer, supra, at 8-12.  Magnet schools are funded through a separate state grant, as detailed above.  
90 GOVERNOR M. JODI RELL’S COMMISSION ON EDUCATION FINANCE, FINAL REPORT 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.opm.state.ct.us/budget/EducationFinance/EduFinanceFinalReport.pdf. 
91 See GOVERNOR M. JODI RELL’S COMMISSION ON EDUCATION FINANCE, supra note 90, at 2-4. 
92 There are several other states that have integrated-oriented open enrollment programs, a few of which 
have existed much longer than Open Choice.  The much older METCO program in Massachusetts, for 
example, has operated since 1966 and currently places 3,300 students from Boston and Springfield in 
suburban school districts. See Metco Program—Massachusetts Department of Education, 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/metco/ (last visited May 9, 2007).  St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Rochester, N.Y. 
also have historically had such programs. See, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0318/p13s01a-lepr.html.  
New programs continue to pop up around the country. For example, as a supplement to its statewide 
interdistrict school choice program, which began in 1990-91, Minnesota now has a special program through 
which urban students from Minneapolis can enroll in suburban schools.  The new program, The Choice Is 
Yours, began in 2001-02 and operates similarly to Connecticut’s Open Choice program.  ELIZABETH A. 
PALMER, THE CHOICE IS YOURS AFTER TWO YEARS: AN EVALUATION, at i (2003).  The Choice is Yours 
provides Minneapolis residents with the opportunity to attend suburban public schools in nine districts and, 
for those who qualify for free or reduced-price lunch, includes no-cost transportation.  Minnesota 
Department of Education, School Choice & Innovation Brochure, Nov. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.education.state.mn.us/mde/Academic_Excellence/School_Choice/Public_School_Choice/index
.html (click on “School Choice & Innovation Brochure”).   
93 See CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE: A SPECIAL 
REPORT, at xvi, 15 (1992) (noting, in 1992, that statewide choice programs remained of limited use in part 
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significant limits on the ability of students to transfer, restricting them to “available 
spaces” or a maximum percentage of the receiving school.  Some, like Open Choice, 
permit only those transfers that do not exacerbate segregation in urban or suburban 
schools.94  Like other programs, Open Choice also suffers from a limited number of 
available spaces.  Yet in bringing students from the city to the suburbs, providing 
financial support for schools and social support for students, coordinating placements, 
providing no-cost transportation to all participants, and with its specific focus on 
facilitating racial and socioeconomic school integration, Open Choice is more accessible 
for low-income families than most open enrollment programs. 
Despite the novelty of programs developed after Sheff and the significant 
resources committed to them, critics have called Sheff a failure.  They have emphasized 
that urban schools continue to be segregated and deride the state for its failure to achieve 
Sheff’s goal of creating a racially desegregated environment for 30% of urban minority 
                                                                                                                                                 
because they did not provide participants with transportation, and that transportation will be “required” for 
such programs to succeed); GILL ET AL., supra note 60, at 121 (attributing relatively low participation rates 
in interdistrict choice programs to the need to travel, and noting that programs that provide transportation 
have higher utilization rates).  The statewide programs in many states are not specifically focused on low-
income or minority students, but in recent years, have begun to provide some limited transportation benefits 
in an effort to induce more low-income residents to participate.  See, e.g., IOWA DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, OPEN ENROLLMENT HANDBOOK AND APPLICATION, 2007-2008 SCHOOL YEAR 8 (2007), 
available at http://www.iowa.gov/educate/content/view/649/636/ (click on “2007-2008 Open Enrollment 
Handbook and Application Form”) (noting that reimbursement for transportation available only for low-
income students attending school in contiguous districts, at rate of $339 annually in 2005-06); WISCONSIN 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT OPEN ENROLLMENT IN WISCONSIN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2006-07), available at http://dpi.state.wi.us/sms/pdf/oebroch.pdf (noting that low-income 
parents can apply to have a portion of their transportation costs reimbursed). 
94 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266aa(c) & (e).  The U.S. Supreme Court currently has under 
consideration two cases challenging the use of race as a factor in assignning students to public schools.  
Though the cases do not concern open enrollment programs explicitly, depending on how the Court holds, 
open enrollment programs that restrict participation along racial lines may also be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 137 
F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. 
Ct. 2531 (2006); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 
416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
126 S. Ct. 2531 (2006).  See also Robert A. Frahm, Race-Based School Selection on Trial: U.S. Supreme 
Court Involving Integration Could Affect Sheff, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 5, 2006, at A1. 
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residents by the end of the 2006-07 school year.95  Yet the critics’ focus on racial 
diversity in city schools alone masks the extent to which the Sheff remedies have 
significantly altered the public educational choices available to white and minority 
families in Connecticut’s metropolitan areas.  As this paper will show, Sheff has 
particularly improved the availability of desirable educational options—and indirectly, 
residential options as well—for middle-class African-American families.  A number of 
lower-income African-American families have also benefited by having the option to 
attend socioeconomically diverse, small, high-quality public schools in their own cities.  
In spite of potential political opposition, which I discuss in greater detail in Part III, these 
programs have expanded to serve an increasing number of students each year.  They also 
have experimental value: for policymakers elsewhere, these programs can provide 
valuable data on how families exercise interdistrict school choice options.  After laying 
out my empirical findings about the programs in Part II, I will use those findings to 
inform a normative discussion of the programs in Part III. 
 
II. Cross-Boundary School Options in New Haven  
This Part presents a detailed empirical analysis of Connecticut’s cross-boundary 
programs as they operate in New Haven.96  The primary focus of Sheff has been on the 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., Robert A. Frahm, Sheff Backers Want Progress, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 28, 2007 
(describing supporters giving state a “failing grade”).  Critics have charged that the state’s implementation 
of voluntary cross-boundary plans has been half-hearted, and as compared with a more significant remedy 
like cross-district busing, is unlikely to remedy court-identified deficiencies in the state’s educational 
system. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2057.  A report done by projects at Trinity College and the 
University of Connecticut using Connecticut Department of Education Data also criticized progress under 
Sheff, finding that actual percentages of Hartford minority public school students in racially integrated 
settings were 12.4% in 2004-05, 14.1% is 2005-06, and projected to be under 15% in 2006-07, up from 
10% in 2002-03 but still far short of the goal of 30%. DOUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 74, at 8. 
96 The discussion focuses on the interdistrict magnet schools but incorporates a detailed study of Open 
Choice as well. 
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creation and aggressive expansion of interdistrict magnet schools in Connecticut’s urban 
areas, and the enrollment and state spending figures reflect this fact.  Even not taking into 
account state-funded construction costs, which totaled a cumulative $255 million from 
1994 through 2001,97 the annual amount of state funding for interdistrict magnet schools 
has risen steadily from $19.4 million in 1999-2000 to $66.9 million in 2004-05.98  In the 
same time period, Open Choice funding has risen from $6.0 million to $9.4 million.99  In 
the 2005-06 school year, New Haven’s fourteen interdistrict magnet schools enrolled 
4,782 students and Open Choice enrolled 476 students; statewide, 14,790 students 
enrolled in forty interdistrict magnet schools, and 1,710 students participated in Open 
Choice.100  Though the creation and expansion of interdistrict magnet schools in Hartford 
has gotten a boost since the 2003 stipulation of the state and Sheff plaintiffs that Hartford 
would move more students into magnet schools,101 New Haven’s interdistrict magnets 
pioneered the concept for Connecticut, enroll the most students,102 and provide a more 
well-established field for study.103 
                                                 
97 CONNECTICUT STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, 
INTERDISTRICT MAGNET SCHOOLS AND MAGNET PROGRAMS IN CONNECTICUT: AN EVALUATION REPORT 13 
(2003). 
98 Connecticut State Department of Education, State Funding for Open Choice and Interdistrict Magnet 
Schools, http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/cedar/edfacts/choice_magnet/index.htm (last visited May 8, 
2007). 
99 Id. 
100 Data calculated from Connecticut State Department of Education, Connecticut Strategic School Profiles, 
Strategic School Profiles by School 2005-06, available at 
http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/der/ssp/SCH0506/SCHOOL.HTM [hereinafter Connecticut 2005-06 
School SSP]; Open Choice Data, supra note 86 (New Haven Open Choice data); DOUGHERTY ET AL., supra 
note 74, at 8 (Hartford Open Choice data); Cooperative Educational Services: Open Choice, 
http://www.ces.k12.ct.us/page.cfm?p=43 (Bridgeport Open Choice data).  The figures for New Haven 
include participants from both New Haven and suburban towns; the statewide figures for the interdistrict 
magnet schools include interdistrict magnet schools operated by Regional Educational Service Centers as 
well as those operated by local school districts. 
101 Following this stipulation, the Hartford School District hired New Haven’s magnet school guru, Edward 
Linehan, to assist in expanding the magnet school program there.  He remained in Hartford for two years 
before returning to New Haven. 
102 Because interdistrict magnet schools operate in both Hartford and its suburbs, there are several possible 
ways to count the number of students in the Hartford interdistrict magnet schools.  If one includes any 
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This Part’s empirical analysis proceeds in several sections.  Section II.A. 
discusses the differential participation rates of urban and suburban students of various 
races, and analyzes the factors that influence differences in those rates.  Though Asian-
American, Hispanic, and American Indian students also attend schools in the New Haven 
region, the discussion focuses primarily on white and African-American students.  It does 
so because Asian-American and American Indian students constitute too small a number 
of attendees to allow for meaningful analysis of their rates of participation,104 and except 
where otherwise discussed, Hispanic students do not exhibit readily observable trends in 
participation to the extent that whites and blacks do.  Section II.B. analyzes the effects 
that the exercise of choice by urban and suburban families has on who attends the New 
Haven public schools and the extent to which these schools are racially and 
socioeconomically integrated.  Section III.C. discusses the Open Choice program and the 
extent to which Open Choice and magnet school participants make choices that appear to 
be motivated by similar factors.  Finally, Section III.D. analyzes the effects of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
interdistrict magnet school open to Hartford students, there are 6,042 students enrolled in “Hartford” 
interdistrict magnet schools, though many of these schools enroll less than one-third of their students from 
the Hartford school district. DOUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 74, at 7.  By most other means of counting, 
though, the number of students in Hartford interdistrict magnets is below that of New Haven.  Including 
only the eleven interdistrict magnet schools located in Hartford, the number drops to 3,428.  Connecticut 
2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100.  Including a slightly different list of the interdistrict magnets that 
enroll over 50% of their students from Hartford, the number is 3,450.  DOUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 74. 
103 Connecticut uses a variety of confusing terms for its interdistrict schools.  The series of magnet schools 
operated by the Hartford School District, which enroll students from across multiple districts, are known as 
host magnet schools, while the identical program in New Haven calls itself interdistrict magnet schools.  
The statutory term for both is “interdistrict magnet school.”  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-264l.  Further 
confusing the issue, there are some charter-type schools operated by non-profits which draw their students 
from multiple districts and are also called interdistrict magnet schools, while charter school is used to refer 
mostly to the privately-operated, state-funded schools that enroll children from only one district.  In this 
paper and in datasets, except where otherwise noted, I use the term “interdistrict magnet school” to refer to 
schools operated by the New Haven school district that enroll students from the city and the suburbs while 
reserving 70% of their seats for New Haven students, and “charter school” to refer to state-funded schools 
operated by private entities, whether or not they enroll students from one or multiple districts. 
104 See Appendix A. 
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exercise of choice by participants in both programs on who attends the suburban public 
schools. 
 
A. Who Attends Interdistrict Magnet Schools and What Motivates Attendees? 
New Haven and suburban students of all races attend interdistrict magnet schools, 
but suburban blacks attend in much greater numbers than suburban whites and are 
motivated by somewhat different factors.  The fourteen New Haven interdistrict magnet 
schools collectively educated 3,476 New Haven residents in 2005-06, about 15% of all 
New Haven residents enrolled in school.105  By comparison, 66% of New Haven school-
aged residents are in non-magnet New Haven public schools, 9% in private (including 
religious) schools,106 5% in charter schools, 2% in Open Choice, and 1% in the Sound 
Vocational Aquaculture School, which also draws students from across the metropolitan 
area.107  Therefore, while they educate a non-trivial number of New Haveners and more 
than any other single school choice option, the likelihood of any particular New Haven 
resident attending a magnet school remains small: 
                                                 
105 New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80; Data calculated from Connecticut State Department of 
Education, 2006 Public & Nonpublic School Enrollment by Town of Residence, 
http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/cedar/cedar/enrollment/enum2006/index.htm [hereinafter Connecticut 
Public & Nonpublic Enrollment]. See Appendix A for a table detailing school-by-school data for each 
magnet school. 
106 Throughout this paper, the term “private school” will include both sectarian and non-sectarian private, 
tuition-charging schools. 
107 Data calculated from Connecticut Public and Nonpublic Enrollment, supra note 105. 
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In addition, 1,306 students from twenty-three suburban districts, 27.3% of the 
students enrolled in magnet schools, participated in the New Haven magnet school 
program in 2005-06.109  The rates of suburban participation vary considerably across the 
twenty-three participating districts, with six nearby districts sending at least one percent 
of their resident school-aged children to receive a public education New Haven, mostly in 
the magnet schools—West Haven, Hamden, East Haven, Ansonia, Derby, and North 
Branford: 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
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110 
Families of suburban students in the magnet schools have chosen to locate in the 
suburbs and like other suburban residents, have free access to the suburban public school.  
Participation by suburban students in the program is completely voluntary.  Why, 
therefore, might some suburban students choose to participate and not others?  If families 
in a particular suburb universally considered the magnet schools worse than that suburb’s 
public schools, then there would be no reason why anyone from that suburb would enter 
the magnet school lottery at all.  On the other hand, if they universally considered the 
magnet schools better, then it seems like a vast majority of the residents of close-in 
suburbs would choose to enter the lottery, or at least those entering the lottery would 
largely track the demographic of public school attendees in that suburb.111  To the extent 
that public sentiment generally considered the schools equivalent, we would also likely 
                                                 
110 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; Connecticut Public and 
Nonpublic Enrollment, supra note 105; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80.  The chart 
includes every town that sends even a single child to school in New Haven, including towns not otherwise 
considered part of the New Haven region for purposes of this paper. 
111 I do not have data on lottery applicants, but we can assume that the demographic of students who in fact 
attend the magnet schools largely tracks the demographic of those that apply, or at least that the lottery does 
not provide suburban blacks with any advantage given that magnet school administrators are under pressure 
to generate schools integrated by race. See, e.g., Frahm, supra note 95. 
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observe no difference in the demographic of attendees as compared to the population 
from which they came, or differences would be idiosyncratic and vary from suburb to 
suburb.  Yet an examination of the demographics of magnet school attendees from the 
participating suburban towns reveal that in reality, suburban blacks and suburban whites 
attend magnet schools as vastly different rates as compared with their attendance in 
suburban public school: 



















West Haven 7.0%  19.5% 51.2%   56.6% 25.5%   20.5% 18.7% 
Hamden 4.2%  15.9% 52.7%   70.4% 30.7%   12.4% 11.3% 
East Haven 3.4%  58.8% 84.5%   20.2% 2.2%   17.5% 9.4% 
Ansonia 2.8%  52.2% 59.0%   37.0% 19.0%   10.9% 19.9% 




75.0% 95.5%   20.0% 1.2%   0.0% 2.1% 





No. 5)113 0.7% 
 
79.2% 86.7%   8.3% 2.2%   12.5% 2.4% 
Seymour 0.6%  100.0% 88.0%   0.0% 3.1%   0.0% 5.6% 
North Haven 0.6%  31.6% 85.5%   57.9% 4.0%   10.5% 3.4% 
Guilford 0.4%  100.0% 91.7%   0.0% 1.1%   0.0% 3.7% 
Wallingford 0.3%  81.0% 84.8%   9.5% 2.5%   4.8% 8.8% 
Milford 0.3%  73.1% 85.4%   23.1% 4.0%   3.8% 5.0% 
Madison – no 
participation 
in magnets 0.1% 
 
 94.9%    0.7%    1.0% 
16 New Haven Region towns listed in order of rate of participation in New Haven Choice schools 
 
                                                 
112 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; Connecticut Public and 
Nonpublic Enrollment, supra note 105; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
113 Regional District Number 5, also known as Amity Regional, includes students from the towns of 
Bethany, Orange, and Woodbridge.  Each town maintains its own schools for grades pre-K through 6, and 
the towns consist of one district for grades 7-12.  (There are three schools in the combined regional district, 
two for grades 7-8 and one for grade 9-12).   For the purposes of this paper, I have considered all the 
schools serving the three towns as part of one district, even though technically the schools serving grades 
pre-K through 6 are not part of the regional district. See Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; 
Connecticut Public and Nonpublic Enrollment, supra note 105. 
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As the chart demonstrates, African-Americans are considerably overrepresented 
among the students who choose to go to the magnet schools as compared with the local 
public schools in every suburb except for two—Seymour and Guilford—where blacks 
constitute a small percentage of the population and don’t participate in the magnet 
schools at all.  The opposite holds true for whites, who are considerably 
underrepresented in all but the same two suburbs.  Interestingly, Hispanics show no such 
dramatic differential.  They attend both sets of schools at roughly similar rates, and are in 
fact overrepresented in five suburbs, plus in Regional District Number Five (three 
suburbs), and are underrepresented in seven suburbs.  To better understand this dynamic, 
the remainder of this Section will focus in part on participation in the six suburban towns 
that send over 1% of their students to New Haven for public school, which together 
account for 85.6% of the suburban students in the magnet schools.  Where useful or 
appropriate, I will include data from all sixteen suburban towns.114 
The observed differences are dramatic, and cannot be explained by economic 
class distinctions alone.  As I will discuss shortly, whites in wealthy school districts are in 
fact less likely to participate in magnet schools than whites in poorer school districts.  It 
is possible that individual wealthy suburbanites, regardless of race or town of residence, 
are more reluctant to send their children to school in the city than their poorer suburban 
counterparts are given the greater income differential between them and the city residents 
                                                 
114 Twenty-three towns in all sent students to the New Haven magnet schools in 2005-06, but I have chosen 
to focus on the seventeen-town New Haven region for the purposes of discussion. See supra note 43.  The 
sixteen suburban towns account for 96.2% of the suburban students in New Haven magnet schools; the 
seventeen towns including New Haven account for 99.0% of all magnet school attendees. Data calculated 
from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
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attending the magnet schools.115  But the data belies this interpretation with regard to 
individual families.  For four out of the top six participating suburbs, magnet school 
students from those suburbs are on average less likely to be receiving a free or reduced-
price school lunch than their suburban public school counterparts, indicating that the 
suburban magnet school students tend to be wealthier than the suburban public school 
students in a given suburb.116  The same holds true when comparing magnet school 
attendees from the city and suburbs; magnet school attendees from those suburbs are 
much less likely to be receiving a free or reduced-price school lunch than their poorer 
classmates who come from the city.117  The city-suburb comparison data even holds true 
when disaggregated by race: black, Hispanic, and white magnet school students from the 
suburbs are all wealthier than their city counterparts of the same race.118  Across racial 
groups, while white suburban attendees are wealthier than black or Hispanic suburban 
attendees, the difference is a small one, and suburban magnet school attendees of all three 
                                                 
115 New Haven has the lowest per capita income of any town in the region.  In 2000, it was $16,393.  The 
per capita income of the region’s suburban towns ranged from a low of $20,504 in Ansonia to $49,049 in 
Woodbridge.  Census 2000 Data, supra note 44. 
116 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80.  Students who come from families with incomes at or below 130% of the federal 
poverty level (“FPL”) qualify for a free lunch, while students from families with incomes between 130% 
and 185% of the FPL qualify for a reduced lunch.  United Way of Connecticut, Infoline, School Lunch and 
Breakfast Programs, 
http://www.infoline.org/InformationLibrary/Documents/School%20Lunch%20and%20Breakfast%20Progr
ams.asp. The FPL is also known as the poverty guidelines, and is calculated annually by the Department of 
Health and Human Services for use in determining financial eligibility in a wide variety of federal and state 
programs.  See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, The 2007 HHS Poverty Guidelines, 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/07poverty.shtml.  For 2007, the guideline is $13,690 for a family of one, and 
rises $3,480 for each additional family member. Id. There have been some studies criticizing the use of 
statistics about free/reduced lunch status as a proxy for poverty, since participation in the lunch programs is 
voluntary and thus the statistics may not capture everyone who is eligible.  It is conceivably possible that 
suburban magnet school attendees of a comparable income to their city counterparts would be less likely to 
apply for a price reduction, but it is unlikely that this phenomenon could account for the entire discrepancy.  
And it seems even less likely that magnet school attendees from the suburbs would systematically differ in 
their participation from suburban public school attendees, making that comparison even more reliable. 
117 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80. 
118 Id. I do not have data on the racial breakdown of suburban public-school attending students who receive 
free or reduced-price lunch, though the comparison may hold true there as well.  
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races are wealthier than city attendees from any of the three.119  Economic comparisons at 
an individual level simply cannot provide an explanation for why even wealthy black 
suburbanites have disproportionate interest in the magnet schools, nor why the magnet 
schools might be more attractive than the suburban public school to even the poorest 
suburban black students that have both as an option. 
The differing rates of attendance hint at the fact that some sort of clustering must 
be at work.  But when the suburbs are compared with one another, the evidence becomes 
even more convincing.  In none of the top six districts does more than 3% of the white 
public school population attend a magnet school, while the percentage of the black public 
school population attending magnet schools from the top six suburbs ranges from 3.9% to 
21.3%: 
                                                 
119 Id. 
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West Haven 7.0%  2.86% 14.66% 5.13 41.3% 25.5% 
Hamden 4.2%  1.49% 10.31% 6.92 26.1% 30.7% 
East Haven 3.4%  2.02% 21.30% 10.54 26.8% 2.2% 
Ansonia 2.8%  2.91% 6.18% 2.12 45.8% 19.0% 




0.62% 12.12% 19.55 8.4% 1.2% 





No. 5) 0.7% 
 
0.42% 1.72% 4.10 
From 1.7% to 
3.5% 2.2% 
Seymour 0.6%  0.38% 0.00% 0.00 13.3% 3.1% 
North Haven 0.6%  0.18% 6.51% 36.17 6.9% 4.0% 
Guilford 0.4%  0.28% 0.00% 0.00 4.3% 1.1% 
Wallingford 0.3%  0.28% 1.12% 4.00 5.3% 2.5% 




in magnets 0.1% 
 
0.00% 0.00% N/A 1.8% 0.7% 
16 New Haven Region towns listed in order of rate of participation in New Haven Choice schools 
 
Significantly, the relative importance of poverty levels and the presence of minority 
students in the public schools affects the school attendance decisions of blacks and whites 
differently.  The rate at which suburban white students choose to attend magnet schools 
tracks the poverty level of the suburb, with whites in the poorest suburbs attending 
magnet schools at the highest rates: 
                                                 
120 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80. 
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121 
Ansonia, West Haven, and Derby, the three poorest districts in the region as 
measured by the free/reduced lunch rate of their public school attendees, have the top 
three rates of white magnet school attendance.  The five wealthiest districts in the region 
by the same measure—Madison, Regional District Number Five, Guilford, Wallingford, 
and North Haven—make up five of the eight districts that send less than one half of one 
percent of their white students to New Haven magnet schools.  Other factors like distance 
may shape overall participation to some extent but do not explain the rate of white 
attendance as well as the poverty level of the district.  The top senders of white students 
include close-in suburbs like West Haven and East Haven as well as further away suburbs 
like Ansonia, Derby, and North Branford.  By comparison, the wealthy suburbs of 
Bethany, Orange, and Woodbridge send fewer students, even though they are closer to 
                                                 
121 Id.  The regression line was fit to the data using the standard least-squares method. 
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New Haven, than Ansonia, Derby, or North Branford, relatively poorer suburbs.  Finally, 
it is possible that the non-presence of blacks in one’s home district may make one less 
likely to attend a predominantly minority magnet school.  Yet among the four districts 
that are more than 10% black, Hamden, the district with the highest percentage of 
African-Americans (30.7%) but also the wealthiest of the four, has the lowest rate of 
white magnet school attendance of the four.  On the flip side, among the six districts that 
are fewer than 3% black, East Haven, the poorest among them, has the fourth highest 
overall rate of white magnet school attendance.  The data therefore suggests that the 
percentage of whites in a given town who choose to attend a magnet school is shaped 
more by that district’s poverty than by the racial composition of the district; as the chart 
illustrates, the poorer the home school district, the more likely its white students are to 
opt for city magnet schools.122 
 The story for African-American suburban students is more complicated. On the 
one hand, in all eleven districts in which blacks participate in the magnet school program 
at all, ranging from poor to wealthy, blacks participate in magnet schools at higher 
rates—sometimes much higher rates—than whites.  This data suggests that at the very 
least, there must be something about the magnet schools that makes them more attractive 
to suburban black residents than to suburban white residents.  On the other hand, while 
always greater than that of whites, the rate of black participation varies significantly from 
district to district among the eleven, from a low of 1.1% in Wallingford to 21.3% in East 
Haven, suggesting that there are some factors influencing black participation that vary 
from town to town.  These factors may be similar to those influencing whites; as a 
                                                 
122 Data in this paragraph comes from the table at supra note 121.  Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-
06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
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percentage of total black public school students, blacks tend to participate in small 
numbers in most of the districts where whites participate in small numbers, suggesting 
that like whites, they are also influenced primarily by the poverty level of their district 
and other factors, like school quality, that may correlate highly with poverty.123 
To get at the factors that uniquely influence black attendance, it is therefore useful 
to examine the rate of black attendance in comparison to white attendance, specifically by 
examining the ratio of black to white magnet school attendance in each of the eleven 
districts that send blacks to magnet schools.  This figure ranges from a low of 1.42 in 
Derby to 36.17 in North Haven (see chart above and graph below).  In comparing this 
ratio with the percentage of a district’s public school attendees that are black, a pattern 
emerges: 
                                                 
123 Data in this paragraph comes from the table at supra note 121.  Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-
06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 41



















0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 32% 36%





Though the complexity of the data does not lend itself to a regression-type analysis, the 
visualization makes clear that a relationship exists between the rates at which African-
Americans choose to attend magnet schools and the presence of other black students in 
the district.  The four districts above a critical mass of 10% black have ratios ranging 
from 1.42 to 6.92, while the seven districts that are 4% black or fewer have ratios ranging 
                                                 
124 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 42
from 4.00 to 36.17—considerably higher.125  This data suggests that black students who 
constitute a small minority in a public school district are even more likely to attend 
magnet schools at greater rates than whites, as compared with their black counterparts in 
districts where they constitute a critical mass. 
The top six participating districts—West Haven, Hamden, East Haven, Ansonia, 
Derby, and North Branford—provide an interesting sub-field for study.  Two of these 
districts—North Branford and East Haven—are on the left side of the chart, with few 
blacks.  In North Branford, the wealthiest of the six districts and only 1.3% black, 12.1% 
of public school-attending blacks choose to attend magnet schools—a rate 19.55 times 
that of whites.  Similarly, in East Haven, which is 2.7% black, 21.3% of public-school 
attending blacks choose to attend magnet schools, the highest of any suburb in the region 
and 10.5 times the rate at which whites there attend.  The other four top districts comprise 
the right side of the chart, districts in which greater than 10% of the students are black.  
In all but West Haven, blacks attend magnet schools at lower rates than in North 
Branford or East Haven—ranging from 3.9% to 10.3%—and in some of the lowest ratios 
overall.126   
Though not an exception to the general trend, West Haven is something of an 
exception among the top six suburbs, in that West Haven has a significant percentage of 
black students in its schools and high rates of magnet school attendance (though its ratio 
of black to white attendance, 5.13, is not anomalous).  But West Haven may also be 
something of its own case.  It has the highest overall rate of magnet school attendance as 
                                                 
125 No district in the region has a black population between 4.0% and 11.6% black, forming a natural 
division between districts that do and do not have a critical mass of black students. Connecticut 2005-06 
District SSP, supra note 45. 
126  Data in this paragraph comes from the table at supra note 121.  Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-
06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 43
a percentage of the district total (6.2%), close to twice that of any other district, and it has 
the second-highest percentage of both black (14.7%) and white (2.9%) attendees in the 
magnet schools, as well as the highest rate of Hispanic attendance (7.8%).  This data 
suggests that there is a higher overall rate of cross-racial dissatisfaction with the West 
Haven schools as compared with other districts, though as the closest suburb to New 
Haven, it is unsurprising that it has the highest rate of attendance.  Even still, the fact that 
blacks in West Haven, at 5.1 times the rate of whites and 1.9 times the rate of Hispanics, 
are leaving a suburban public school district that is 25.5% black for magnet schools that 
are 60.7% black, suggests that race has something to do with the choices of West 
Haven’s black families.127 
The overarching message of the data is clear: black students in the suburbs are 
more likely to choose magnet schools than their white counterparts, and black students in 
suburbs where they are token in numbers are much more likely to do so.  Black students 
who reside in the suburbs have a higher rate of magnet school attendance in every one of 
the six districts with the highest level of overall participation than whites have in any of 
them.  Across those six districts, blacks make up 20.4% of the suburban public school-
attending population but constitute 52.8% of the population that those suburbs send to the 
New Haven magnet schools.128  The same holds true more broadly; across the sixteen 
                                                 
127 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80.  Another explanation for this phenomenon could be that white families are also 
leaving at high rates, only they send their children to private schools instead of New Haven magnet schools.  
But the data suggest the unlikelihood of this scenario: 90.2% of the total student population of West Haven 
is enrolled in public schools, a higher rate than that of 4 out of the other 5 districts (only North Branford is 
higher, at 94.9%).  See Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45.  Even if whites still left at a 
higher rate for private school than blacks, though, that explanation would only serve to reframe the 
question into one with a similar answer: in a three-way choice between suburban public schools, private 
schools, and magnet schools, why do black families choose magnet schools at such greater rates? 
128 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80. 
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suburban districts in the New Haven region (not including New Haven), blacks make up 
9.8% of the suburban public school-attending population but are 48.3% of the population 
that those suburbs send to magnet schools.129  It is possible, of course, to argue that 
blacks’ choice of magnet schools is not based on blacks’ own preferences but rather that 
black families are simply filling up slots from which whites own racism has kept them 
away.  Yet because participation is voluntary, presumably suburban black families would 
not affirmatively choose to send their children to magnet schools if they did not view 
those schools as providing superior opportunities for their children.  Furthermore, as 
shown above, whites’ relative participation tracks the sending district’s poverty much 
more closely than it does the racial composition of the whites’ hometown, which might 
not be the case if racism kept white families from participating.130 
Given that blacks participate at higher rates in every town where they participate 
at all, blacks on average must perceive New Haven magnet schools as superior to 
suburban public schools—at least for their children—in ways that whites and those of 
other races do not.131  Given the existence of relatively good quality school choice 
                                                 
129 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80.  Even though many more students of each racial group in a given suburb attend a 
suburban public school as compared to a magnet school, magnet school attendance nevertheless has a 
modest negative effect on the percentage of African-Americans in the suburban public schools.  The black 
population of the suburban public schools themselves in the six suburbs, not including the magnet school 
attendees, is 18.9% (compared with 20.4% overall), while in the sixteen suburbs it is 9.0% (compared with 
9.8% overall).  These differences may seem small, as indeed they are, though they are worth remarking 
upon insofar as the interdistrict school choice options themselves are quite small—only 6 districts send 1% 
or more of their students to New Haven, and no district sends more than 7% of its students there.  Data 
calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra 
note 80. 
130 For example, whites in white, working-class East Haven are more likely to send their kids to magnet 
schools than whites in relatively integrated, middle-class Hamden, which we would not expect were white 
racism the determining factor in white participation.   
131 In the aggregate, members of other races do not appear to value the magnet schools as superior in the 
way that blacks do.  Among the top six districts, Hispanic rates of magnet school attendance, though 
everywhere higher than those of whites, trail those of blacks for all six.  Asian rates of attendance trail 
those of blacks for all but one district, Derby, where 2 Asian magnet school attendees constitute 8.3% of 
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options for African-Americans who have chosen to live in the suburbs, the patterns in 
black families’ choices suggest that the predominant factor driving higher rates of black 
participation in the magnet schools is a preference for their children to attend school with 
a critical mass of other black students.  Of course, this preference is clearly not the only 
factor driving black families’ choices, since wealthy suburbs exhibit relatively lower 
participation rates of both whites and blacks, and blacks in suburbs where they have 
attained a critical mass still participate at greater rates than whites there.  Still, this overall 
trend, combined with the fact that the preference manifests itself at its strongest in those 
suburbs where blacks are token in numbers, suggests that African-Americans’ preference 
for magnet schools is due to clustering—a desire to attend school with other African-
American students that manifests itself most strongly but not exclusively among blacks in 
districts where they are token in numbers.  I will further explore the implications of this 
phenomenon in Part III. 
 
B. Effects of the Exercise of School Choice on the New Haven Public Schools 
The Sheff parties assumed that the new interdistrict magnet schools to be created 
in Connecticut’s urban areas would be racially and socioeconomically integrated.132  
Given that like Hartford, New Haven has by far the lowest per capita income of any town 
in its region,133 and that in the 1994-95 school year, 94.9% of the New Haven region’s 
white public school-attending students attended school outside of New Haven, while 
73.2% of the region’s black and 71.8% of the region’s Hispanic students attended school 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Derby’s Asian public school student population, out of a total of 24 Asian students who live in Derby. 
Data calculated from New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
132 See Stipulation and Order, Sheff v. O’Neill, No. X03-89-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2003). 
133 Census 2000 Data, supra note 44. 
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in New Haven, it was hard to imagine that opening the door to suburban students could 
do anything but integrate urban schools.134  The schools also had the potential to attract 
New Haven whites away from private schools, where 38.2% of New Haven school-aged 
whites attended school in 1990.135  If the schools proved of equal interest to all racial 
groups enrolled in private and suburban public schools in the region, the fact that across 
the region, whites made up 87.4% of the suburban public school population in 1994-95136 
and about 80% of the private school population137 meant that the suburban students 
entering the program would be predominantly white. 
Yet as the discussion in Section II.A. makes clear, in comparison with whites, 
African-Americans living outside of New Haven have disproportionately chosen to leave 
suburban districts, in which they are the minority, and enroll in New Haven magnet 
schools, where they constitute a majority.  As a result, more black students than white 
students from the suburbs enroll in New Haven magnet schools (631 versus 439 in 2005-
06, or 48.3% as compared to 33.6% of the total suburban enrollment in the magnet 
schools),138 even though blacks constitute a small fraction of the overall suburban 
population.  Yet because the overwhelming majority of the white public school-attending 
population in the New Haven region resides in the suburbs (95.9% in 2005-06),139 we 
might expect that reserving 30% of the spots in interdistrict magnet schools for suburban 
students would nevertheless lead to somewhat greater numbers of white students in those 
                                                 
134 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45. 
135 Census 2000 NCES Data, supra note 78. 
136 Data calculated from Connecticut 1993-94 District SSP, supra note 45. 
137 Exact private school attendance data for the mid-1990s is not available; in the 1999-00 school year, 
whites made up 78.9% of population of private school attendees who lived in the 17-town New Haven 
region, including the city of New Haven.  Census 2000 NCES Data, supra note 78. 
138 Data calculated from New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80.  These percentages do not add to 
100% since suburban members of other racial groups also enroll. 
139 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45. 
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schools than would otherwise be in the New Haven public school system.  Furthermore, 
we might also expect the schools to feature a greater level of socioeconomic integration, 
since we would expect suburban whites and minorities to be better off than their city 
counterparts, and that some middle class minority and white New Haven residents would 
also choose the magnet schools over their current option of private schools. 
The data bears these suspicions out.  Turning first to race, New Haven’s 
interdistrict magnet schools have in fact managed to achieve a somewhat greater level of 
racial integration than other New Haven public schools, but the results are not nearly as 
dramatic as the Sheff proponents had hoped.  Including students from both New Haven 
and the suburbs, white students constitute 9.7% of the non-magnet New Haven public 
school population but 15.4% of the magnet population.140  The high schools show a 
sharper disparity: whites constitute 6.7% of the non-magnet New Haven high school 
population but 19.3% of the magnet high schools population, and the percent white 
population at 5 of the 6 magnet high schools is larger than that at any of the non-magnet 
high schools.141  In fact, in 2005-06 more whites attended all magnet high schools 
combined (377—63.3% of the total), than attended traditional public high schools (218), 
even though traditional public high schools educated 1.67 times as many students as the 
magnet high schools.142 
Helped by the fact that approximately thirty percent of their students come from 
the relatively wealthy suburban population, New Haven’s fourteen interdistrict magnet 
schools are more socioeconomically integrated than New Haven’s non-magnet schools.  
                                                 
140 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100.  For a detailed breakdown of all 
magnet schools and non-magnet high schools by race and free/reduced lunch status, see Appendix A. 
141 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100.  See Appendix A. 
142 Id. 
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All six magnet high schools and six of the eight elementary and middle schools have a 
lower percentage of students receiving free/reduced lunch than the New Haven public 
school average, 61.7%.143  Again, the high schools provide a particularly dramatic 
contrast; the percentage at magnet high schools ranges from 49.5% to 61.1%, while at 
non-magnet high schools it ranges from 70.1% to 87.0%.144 
For the 2005-06 school year, the data suggests that the magnet schools, as the 
most racially and socioeconomically integrated schools in New Haven, contribute to the 
integration of the New Haven public schools as a whole.  But this is only true if we 
assume that the white and/or wealthy students in the magnet schools would not otherwise 
be in the New Haven public school system.  Because over four times as many New 
Haven residents attend traditional public schools as opposed to magnet schools,145 if the 
magnet schools are “skimming” a disproportionate number of wealthy and/or white 
students out of the system, then they may have the effect of further isolating low-income 
and minority New Haveners in the non-magnet public schools.146  However, as I will 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. Because the data on free/reduced lunch status only distinguishes between those making below a 
certain threshold and everyone else, see supra note 116, it cannot help discern whether any of the students 
in the non-free lunch category are members of the upper middle class or higher strata of the income 
spectrum.  For example, children who come from families whose income is above 185% of the federal 
poverty level—$38,202 for a family of four in 2007—would show up as ineligible for free lunch, whether 
their annual family income is $40,000 or $200,000.  (To understand just how many people that 
encompasses, among children attending school in 1999-2000, 42% of New Haven residents, and 81% of 
suburban residents, lived in households with a household income above $40,000.  Census 2000 Data, supra 
note 44.)  Therefore, the extent to which the magnet schools are fully socioeconomically integrated is 
unclear.  The data does, however, support the conclusion that in New Haven, the average magnet school 
student is wealthier than the average traditional public school student, and that a few students from suburbs 
with average incomes at the top end of the regional spectrum choose to enroll.  Yet among white students, 
the strong inverse correlation between rates of attendance and average income in a given suburb, discussed 
in Section III.A., suggests that overall the interdistrict magnet schools enroll very few of the region’s 
wealthiest students. 
145 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100. 
146 See Lewin, supra note 71, at 96 (2005) (discussing study that found that 75-98% of students who 
transferred within a district pursuant to No Child Left Behind were top performers and came from higher 
income families); Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional Guarantees 
of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2004-05 (1996) (discussing the problem of skimming 
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discuss, an examination of enrollment trends over time reveals that the magnet schools do 
not appear to be poaching students from the non-magnet schools.  In fact, the magnet 
schools appear to have helped stem a longer-term decline in the number of white students 
in the New Haven public school system.  I focus mostly on racial data in the remainder of 
this Section since the racial data is available at a greater level of specificity than the 
free/reduced lunch data.147 
To understand the degree to which the magnet schools contribute to the 
integration of the system as a whole, it is first useful to separately examine the 
contribution made by students coming from the suburbs.  First, they contribute to racial 
integration.  Suburban whites constitute a majority—59.4% in 2005-06—of the whites in 
the New Haven interdistrict magnet schools, and they, like suburban minority attendees, 
would most likely would not be attending public school in New Haven were it not for the 
magnet schools program.148  In assessing the degree that suburban students contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                 
within and across districts).  Skimming may be less of a potential problem with regard to high school-aged 
students, because only 1.67 times as many New Haven residents attend traditional public high schools as 
opposed to magnet high schools.   
147 In particular, the number of students at any given school who identify as members of a particular racial 
category is available from 1993-94 through 2005-06.  The free lunch data is not as specific, identifying 
only a total percentage of students at each school receiving free/reduced lunch.  Also, while the 
free/reduced lunch data may be useful for comparing the relative poverty of a given school with others in a 
given school year, it is not as helpful for comparisons over time.  The free/reduced lunch data proves less 
reliable over time due to fluctuations—individual students may participate in the free/reduced lunch 
program in some years and not others, and changing economic conditions over time may shape broader 
trends as much if not more than shifting school enrollments.  Because students presumably do not identify 
as different races from one year to the next, race provides an easier dimension along which to assess school 
integration over time. 
148 Data calculated from New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80.  I say “most likely” because it is 
possible that some black families, who feel that their child or children would be harmed by being a token in 
their school environment, would be willing to live in the suburbs only because of the availability of 
interdistrict magnet schools, and were they not available, would choose to live in New Haven.  Similarly, it 
is also possible that were interdistrict magnet schools not available, a suburban white family, desiring an 
integrated school environment for their children but otherwise inclined to live in the suburbs, would move 
from the suburbs to New Haven so that their children could go to school there.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
these suburban students live in the suburbs and attend school in New Haven suggests that the weight of 
whatever non-school factors shape their families’ choice of residential decision has caused them to live in 
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the integration of the New Haven public schools, one must also take into account the 
black and Hispanic students from the suburbs, who in effect contribute “negatively” to 
integration in a majority-minority school system.  Yet because they represent only 21.9% 
and 18.9% of the black and Hispanic students in the magnet schools, respectively,149 if 
the suburban students of all three racial groups were removed from the New Haven 
schools, the percentage of minorities in the New Haven schools would rise. 
Second, the suburban students make a positive contribution with respect to 
socioeconomic integration.  The average student from each of these three racial groups 
comes from a higher-earning household than his or her New Haven counterpart.150  The 
presence of suburban students therefore contributes positively to socioeconomic and 
racial integration of the New Haven magnet schools, and has no direct effect on the 
population of the traditional public schools.  To the extent that socioeconomic isolation 
has been shown to be a more significant factor than racial isolation in school 
performance,151 the discrepancies in income across each racial group’s city and suburban 
counterparts are a positive sign for New Haveners of all races who attend magnet 
schools. 
Third, one can assume that some of the New Haven whites attending magnet 
schools would otherwise be attending private (including parochial) schools as opposed to 
a non-magnet public school, meaning that those students would not otherwise be 
                                                                                                                                                 
the suburbs, and it is likely that were the magnet schools not available, few of them would move to New 
Haven for the purpose of sending their child to a traditional public school there. 
149 Data calculated from New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
150 Among magnet school attendees, 45.7% of New Haven whites and only 16.2% of suburban whites 
receive free/reduced lunch; 67.3% of New Haven blacks and only 30.4% of suburban blacks do; 77.4% of 
New Haven Hispanics and only 39.4% of suburban Hispanics do.  Data calculated from New Haven 
Magnet School Data, supra note 80.  Again, as noted above, these figures do not distinguish between 
middle class and upper middle class or wealthy families. 
151 See Lewin, supra note 71, at 97, 125-129. 
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contributing to racial integration in the New Haven public schools.  The question of 
whether or not the magnet schools have attracted white or middle class students of any 
race who would not otherwise be attending public schools cannot be answered directly, 
but the data suggests that the magnet schools have a had an overall positive effect on 
public school attendance.  Looking first across all racial groups, the past decade has seen 
as significant rise in the percentage of New Haven school-aged children who attend 
public school, including magnet schools and suburban public schools through Open 
Choice.  Public school attendance rates exhibited their sharpest increases in two distinct 
periods—from 1993-94 through 1999-00, and then again from 2002-03 to 2005-06, as the 
graph shows: 
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Rate of Overall Public School Attendance Compared to Interdistrict Magnet & Non-












































































This chart focuses on the data for the magnet high schools—which accounted for 70% of 
all magnet school students in 2005-06—as well as the non-magnet high schools.153  The 
data reveals that periods in which overall public school attendance rates (the bars) 
exhibited the sharpest increases—from 1993-94 through 1999-00, and then again from 
2002-03 through 2005-06—roughly correspond to periods of development and expansion 
of the interdistrict magnet school program, suggesting that the magnet schools may have 
contributed to bringing in or retaining families in the public school system who might 
                                                 
152 Data calculated from every available year of Connecticut State Department of Education, Connecticut 
Strategic School Profiles, Strategic School Profiles by District, available at 
http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/der/ssp/index.htm [hereinafter Connecticut District SSP All Years], and 
Connecticut State Department of Education, Connecticut Strategic School Profiles, Strategic School 
Profiles by School, available at http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/der/ssp/index.htm [hereinafter 
Connecticut School SSP All Years] 
153 Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100. 
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otherwise have sent their children to private school.  The number of non-magnet high 
school students see-sawed between 1993-94 and 1999-00, corresponding to a period of 
high growth among the interdistrict magnet high schools, which suggests that some of the 
growth of the magnet high schools may have come at the expense of their non-magnet 
counterparts during this period.  Since 1999-00, the non-magnet high schools have 
experienced steady growth, even though the overall rate of public school attendance 
seesawed between 1999-00 and 2002-03 and began steady growth again in 2002-03—
exactly when the number of students in the non-magnet high schools were starting to 
level off.  The fact that the periods of growth of the magnet high schools and overall 
public school enrollment coincide, while neither coincides with the period of growth of 
non-magnet high schools, suggests that while from 1993-94 to 1999-00 the increase in 
magnet school enrollment likely came at the expense of both non-public schools and 
traditional public schools, the growth in magnet school enrollment since 2002-03 has 
most likely come from students leaving non-public schools to enroll in magnet schools or 
entering the school system for the first time.154 
                                                 
154 Data in this paragraph comes from the table at supra note 152.  Data calculated from Connecticut  
District SSP All Years, supra note 152; Connecticut School SSP All Years, supra note 152.  Another factor 
supporting this conclusion, albeit indirectly, is that the rise in the number of students in the non-magnet 
high schools has likely been influenced by the large increase in the number of Hispanic students enrolled in 
the New Haven public schools across this period.  In New Haven schools overall, the number of Hispanics 
rose from 4354 to 6866 across this twelve year period, a gain of 57%.  Compared with other racial groups, 
New Haven Hispanics are disproportionately less likely to enroll in magnet schools; they constituted 37% 
of New Haveners in non-magnet public schools in 2005-06, but only 25% of the New Haveners in magnet 
schools during that period.  As a result, the added presence of Hispanics in New Haven has increased the 
percentage of Hispanic students in the New Haven public schools at the expense of both whites and blacks 
(from 24.3% in 1993-94 to 33.9% in 2005-06, with blacks falling five percentage points and whites falling 
four), and has likely helped boost the overall rate of public school attendance and the number of students in 
the non-magnet high schools.  The fact that increasing rates of public school attendance nevertheless still 
correspond with the increases in the number of students in the magnet high schools further supports the 
notion that as the magnet schools have expanded, they have not done so at the expense of students in the 
non-magnet public schools.  Data in this paragraph calculated from Connecticut 1993-94 District SSP, 
supra note 45; Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra 
note 100. 
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 Looking across racial groups, however, does not reveal the extent to which the 
magnet schools may be drawing middle class white and minority families out of other 
New Haven public schools.  Unfortunately, I do not have access to data that would enable 
me to do a cross-tabulation by income and race of students attending non-magnet public 
schools, so I have to look at these variables separately.  The overall number of whites in 
the New Haven public schools declined over the first six years of the magnet school 
program but has stabilized over the most recent six years: 
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As the chart illustrates, the magnet schools have claimed an ever-greater percentage of 
total white enrollment over time, and as more whites in the public school system have 
shifted to the magnet schools, it is likely that the magnet schools have become an even 
                                                 
155 Data calculated from Connecticut  District SSP All Years, supra note 152; Connecticut School SSP All 
Years, supra note 152. 
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more attractive alternative for those whites remaining in the non-magnet public 
schools.156  Yet the year-by-year trends in white enrollment suggest that the magnet 
schools have had at worse a neutral effect on the total number of whites in the non-
magnet public schools, and at best, a positive effect in stemming further declines from the 
public school system as a whole.   From 1993-1994 through 1999-00, the New Haven 
public schools on the whole continued to lose white students.  In this time the magnet 
schools showed a modest increase, but even if that increase resulted entirely from 
students transferring from non-magnet public schools, most of the white departures from 
the non-magnet public schools can be attributed to exit from the system entirely, since 
whites left the non-magnet public schools at a much faster rate than new whites entered 
the magnet ones.  It therefore appears that during this era the magnet schools merely held 
back what would otherwise have been a faster flow of white students out of the New 
Haven public school system.157 
Starting in 1999-00, the overall pace of white student departures from the New 
Haven public school system has leveled off.  In fact, there has been no net average 
                                                 
156 Studies show that as the proportion of whites in a public school declines, whites are further deterred 
from enrolling in that school.  See Betsy Levin, Race and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW supra note 55, at 266, 280-81 (noting studies that show that 
the proportion of minorities in a public school affects whether or not whites choose to enroll in public 
school, and that in a choice regime, whites will choose schools with lower percentages of minority 
students).  A conceivable exception to the trend towards magnet schools could be Wilbur Cross High 
School, which has a well-regarded honors track in which a majority of the students are white. See Nicholas 
Zamiska, Tracking Proves a Volatile Issue in New Haven’s Schools, YALE HERALD, Oct. 27, 2000, 
available at http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/xxx/2000.10.27/news/p5trackingnh.html (noting in 2000 
that whites make up 13% of the student body but a majority of students in the honors track).  The 
percentage of white students at Wilbur Cross has see-sawed over time, declining from 19.7% in 1993-94 to 
13.1% in 1998-99, before re-rising to 16.5% in 2000-01 and then dropping again to 10.6% in 2005-06.  The 
school’s population, though, has risen steadily through this time from 1197 students in 1993-94 to 1814 
students in 2005-06, as the number of black and Hispanic students has increased considerably.  In absolute 
numbers, therefore, white enrollment has remained within a narrow range, declining from 236 in 1993-94 
to a low of 171 in 1996-97, before rebounding to a high of 250 in 2002-03 and declining again to 192 in 
2005-06. Data about Wilbur Cross High School calculated from Connecticut School SSP All Years, supra 
note 152. 
157 Data in this paragraph comes from the table at supra note 155.  Data calculated from Connecticut  
District SSP All Years, supra note 152; Connecticut School SSP All Years, supra note 152. 
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outflow since the 1999-00 school year, and 2004-05 white total enrollment (2282) is 
actually higher than 1999-2000 white total enrollment was (2274), though 2005-06 
enrollment fell below 1999-2000 enrollment (2229).158  The number of whites in the non-
magnet public schools has continued to decline, albeit at a more modest rate, while the 
magnet schools have exhibited a slight increase in the number of students since this time.  
While this could suggest that the magnet schools may in fact be absorbing white students 
from the other public schools in recent years, one must also take into account the increase 
in the number of suburban whites attending New Haven magnet schools across this 
period.  By 2005-06, suburban whites constituted 59.4% of the white students in the 
magnet schools, or about 19.5% of the total whites attending public school in New 
Haven.159  But whether growth of suburban student numbers has been steady or sporadic 
since suburban students first entered the system in 1995-96, they account for a significant 
portion of increase in numbers of white students in the magnet schools over time that the 
graph illustrates.160  Particularly given that other non-magnet schools attractive to whites 
like Wilbur Cross High School actually saw a 15-year peak in the number of white 
students as late as 2002-03,161 it therefore appears that in the aggregate, the magnet 
schools are probably only absorbing a handful of white students who would otherwise 
attend a New Haven public school.  On the flip side, though, and more speculatively, the 
                                                 
158 Data calculated from Connecticut  District SSP All Years, supra note 152.  The numbers appear to be in 
a period of fluctuation rather than steady decline.  Though 2005-06 overall white enrollment is lower than 
the previous year, 2006-07 enrollment may well be larger.  2006-07 overall enrollment numbers were not 
available, but the magnet schools enrollment for 2006-07 increased by 39 whites, to 772 from 733 in 2005-
06, after having fallen from 744 whites in 2004-05.  New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
159 New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80; Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45.  
Though few white suburban students enter the interdistrict magnet schools as compared with the total white 
suburban population, suburban whites still constitute a majority of the white students (though as of 2005-
06, only 33.6% of the suburban students) in the interdistrict magnet schools.  New Haven Magnet School 
Data, supra note 80. 
160 Unfortunately, I do not have data on the numbers of suburban students attending the magnet schools in 
the years between 1995-96 and 2005-06. 
161 See supra note 156. 
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data also suggests that magnet schools cannot fully stem the tide of white departures from 
the public school system; if the suburban students had not been present, the system likely 
would have continued to lose white students at a rate closer to that over the first few 
years shown on the chart. 
 Looking at the high schools alone—a subset of the population just discussed—
helps further develop our understanding of school attendance dynamics over time.  The 
magnet high schools appear to have played a significant role in retaining white students 
in the system, whose enrollment in New Haven high schools actually sharply increased 
through 2001-02 before modestly decreasing over the past several years.162  From 1996-
97 through 2001-02, white enrollment in both the magnet and non-magnet high schools 
increased.  Since 2002-03, enrollment in the non-magnet high schools has declined 
somewhat while that of the magnet schools appears to have reached something of a 
steady equilibrium: 
                                                 
162 Connecticut School SSP All Years, supra note 152. 
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163 
Though the rapid rise in white enrollment in the magnet high schools has contributed 
most to the retention of white high school students in the system, this retention has not 
come at the expense of the non-magnet high schools, whose numbers of white students 
continued to grow, albeit modestly, from 1996-97 through 2002-03, roughly the period 
when the magnet high schools also experienced their strongest growth.  Only from 1995-
96 to 1996-97 and 2002-03 to 2004-05, when the number of students in the magnet 
schools rose while that in the non-magnet high schools declined, did the magnet schools 
potentially gain at the expense of the non-magnet high schools. 
Census data regarding the rates of enrollment in private schools by race supports 
the idea that the magnet schools did not poach white students from the public schools.  
As of the 1999-2000 school year, about 40% of New Haven white schoolchildren 
attended private schools, though only 7% of black and 5% of Hispanic schoolchildren 
                                                 
163 Id. 
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did.164  New Haven whites therefore sent their children to private school at a rate that 
vastly outstripped the national and New Haven region averages, while black and Hispanic 
families attended private school at much lower rates.165  This data suggests that those 
New Haven whites who can afford it are much more likely to send their children to 
private school than a regular New Haven public school, either in the first instance or if 
they cannot get their child into a magnet school.  Income differentials alone cannot 
explain the difference, as New Haven whites at all income levels are considerably more 
likely to send their children to private school than blacks or Hispanics at the same income 
level: 
Rates of Private School Attendance for New Haven Children, 
































































































                                                 
164 Census 2000 NCES Data, supra note 78. 
165 Id. 
166 Id.  Studies attempting to explain differential enrollment rates of whites and members of minority 
groups of similar incomes have found that whites are particularly sensitive to the proportion of minority 
students in the public schools.  See GILL ET AL., supra note 60, at 173 (discussing a study that found that 
when the proportion of minority students in the public schools rose by one standard deviation, white, 
college-educated parents became one-third more likely to enroll their children to private schools). 
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Furthermore, the rate of private school attendance among whites does not appear to have 
changed significantly over time: in 1990, 38.2% of New Haven school-aged whites 
enrolled in private school, while in 2000, 39.6% did.167  The fact that these numbers held 
steady even as white children continued to leave the New Haven schools in modest 
numbers suggests that the decrease in white students was shaped more by whites moving 
to the suburbs than by whites staying in New Haven and leaving the public schools for 
private schools, at least through 2000.168  The data also suggests that the large increase in 
the white high school population through the second half of the 1990s, driven mostly by 
growth in the interdistrict magnet high schools, may be largely attributable to increasing 
numbers of suburban whites entering these schools, rather than New Haven whites 
leaving private school for these schools.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that white students 
will fully disappear from the public school system (including the magnet schools) any 
time soon; most poor and lower middle class New Haven whites do remain in public 
school, as the above chart shows.  These individuals may not, for financial reasons, have 
access to the alternatives of private school or moving to the suburbs, and as a result may 
form a relatively immobile core constituency for the New Haven public, including the 
magnet, schools. 
*     *     * 
As a result of the differential attractiveness of magnet schools to suburban whites 
and blacks, and of private schools to New Haven whites and blacks, the New Haven 
                                                 
167 Census 1990: National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) data related to the population of school-
aged children was generated using customized tables from “Census 1990 School District Tabulation Data,” 
available at U.S. Census Bureau, School District Demographics System, 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/datatools.asp (last visited May. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Census 1990 NCES 
Data]; Census 2000 NCES Data, supra note 78. 
168 Though overall rates of public school enrollment as a percentage of the total student population are 
available for each year, data on rates of private school enrollment by race over time (except for 1990 and 
2000) is not available. 
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magnet schools have a significantly greater percentage of black students, and a 
significantly lesser percentage of white students, than one would predict from looking at 
the potential applicant pool of New Haven and suburban students.169  In Part III, I will 
explore some potential reasons behind and implications of this differential attractiveness. 
 
C. Factors Motivating Open Choice Participants 
 The Open Choice program, though much smaller than the interdistrict magnet 
school program, also constitutes a key component of the Sheff remedies.  Data from Open 
Choice enriches our understanding of school choice dynamics in the New Haven 
metropolitan area.  For several reasons, it is more difficult to draw conclusions from the 
Open Choice Data about the extent of school-based clustering in the New Haven 
metropolitan area.  First, though expanding rapidly, the Open Choice program serves 
only about one-tenth the number of students as the magnet schools, or less than two 
                                                 
169 If urban and suburban public school-attending whites and blacks in the New Haven region applied and 
were admitted to magnet schools in numbers proportionate to their population, in 2005-06 the magnet 
schools would have been 40.3% black, 31.2% white, and 26.1% Hispanic, as compared with actual figures 
of 60.7% black, 15.5% white, and 22.5% Hispanic.  Data calculated from Connecticut 2005-06 District 
SSP, supra note 45; New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80.  Even with a disproportionate number 
of black applicants, the magnet schools are still more integrated than the New Haven public schools as a 
whole.  On first glance, we might expect that the differential rates of attractiveness of magnet schools to 
whites and blacks would lead to the interdistrict magnet schools having a smaller percentage of white 
students than the New Haven public schools as a whole.  But this is not the case, of course, for at least two 
reasons.  First, even though whites are grossly underrepresented as compared with their proportion in the 
suburban population as a whole, whites still constitute 33.6% of the suburban students entering the magnet 
schools.  New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80. 
Given that 30% of the spots in magnet schools are set aside for suburban students, the relative white 
magnet school population will be higher as compared with most other New Haven public schools than only 
draw their students from New Haven.  Second, the same clustering and other forces shaping magnet school 
attendance among the suburban population will work in reverse among New Haven public school-attending 
residents.  Whites and blacks will both be drawn to the magnet schools for some similar reasons, including 
smaller class size, a better physical plant, and better funding.  But New Haven whites inclined to cluster 
will be especially interested in attending magnet schools, given their greater white population, while black 
New Haven residents with similar inclinations will not exhibit any particular preference for the magnet 
schools. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 62
percent of the New Haven district’s students overall.170  The small numbers make any 
conclusions from cross-district comparisons suspect.  Second, participants from New 
Haven are spread around multiple districts (thirteen in 2006-07) based on the availability 
of placements, and individual students may only choose among available placements.171  
Districts in 2006-07 averaged about 33 students each, with four taking 10 or fewer: 
Open Choice Participants by Race and Receiving District (2006-07)172 
Receiving 





Wallingford 75 18 8     101 
Hamden 88 7   1 1 97 
North Haven 52 17 20 1 2 92 
New Haven 31 10 11     52 
North 
Branford 13 9     2 24 
Milford 18 3       21 
Branford 9 9 2     20 
Orange 16 1 1   1 19 
Cheshire 12 3 1     16 
Reg. Dist. #5 6 1 4   1 12 
Woodbridge 4 1 2 1 2 10 
East Haven 6 1 1     8 
Bethany 2 1       3 
Ansonia 1         1 
Total 333 81 50 3 9 476 
 
As a result, a comparison between receiving districts with such small numbers 
may not be productive.  Third, participants from New Haven must have been attending a 
                                                 
170 Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  Data for the Open Choice program is based on the 2006-07 school 
year, unlike the magnet schools and overall district data which comes from the 2005-06 school year.  
Therefore, direct comparisons between enrollment numbers of the Open Choice and the population of 
magnet schools or school districts are approximate. 
171 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266aa(e).  The statute provides that the regional educational service center 
in charge of the program shall convene an annual meeting for school districts to report the number of 
available spaces for out-of-district students.  The statute does not mandate that districts provide a minimum 
number of spaces or otherwise define availability, but it does require that once a receiving district accepts a 
given student, it must allow that student to remain in a district until he or she graduates from high school. 
Id. 
172 Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
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New Haven public school at the time of application.173  Some 40% of New Haven’s white 
students attend private schools;174 therefore, many of the white students who might be 
most inclined to exercise a school choice option are prevented from participating in Open 
Choice.  It is likely that most are unwilling to first send their child to a New Haven public 
school for a year in exchange for a small chance in a lottery to send their child to a 
suburban public school.  The magnet schools, by contrast, accept applications from those 
attending private or charter schools at the time of application.175  Fourth, the state’s Open 
Choice law requires that the lottery be structured in such a way that overall, the program 
preserves or increases racial, ethnic, and economic diversity, and that preference be given 
to children attending schools identified as “in need of improvement” under the Federal 
No Child Left Behind Act.176  As a result, who participates in the program may therefore 
not be fully representative of who applies to participate. 
Despite these caveats, the data from the Open Choice program still supports this 
paper’s broader conclusions about differential participation rates and clustering of 
African-American students.  First, the data on participants in Open Choice from outside 
New Haven generally reflects differential participation in a similar way to the data from 
                                                 
173 Area Cooperative Educational Services, Open Choice—Q&A, 
http://www.aces.k12.ct.us/services/programdevelopment/open_qa.aspx (last visited May 8, 2007). 
174 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text. 
175 See New Haven Public Schools, Interdistrict Magnet Schools—New Haven, Connecticut, supra note 81. 
176 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266aa(e).  Despite this provision, white students are not systematically 
excluded from the lottery.  Twenty New Haven schools were identified as “in need of improvement” in 
2005-06.  See Connecticut State Department of Education, No Child Left Behind—State, District and 
School NCLB Results, http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/cedar/nclb/dist_school_nclb_results/index.htm 
(last visited May 8, 2007).  It is unclear how much the lottery results deviate from random chance as a 
result of either of these provisions.  The experience of other states, though, suggests that it might deviate 
significantly. See, e.g., Constance Hawke, Commentary, The “Choice” for Urban School Districts: Open 
Enrollment or Desegregation?, 115 ED. L. REP. 609, 612, 616-17 (1997) (noting that virtually all students 
who applied to transfer out of urban districts of Akron, Ohio, Omaha, Nebraska, and Des Moines, Iowa to 
the suburbs were white). 
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the magnet school participants.177  Of the suburban participants, 59.6% are African-
American, 21.2% are Hispanic and 19.2% are white.178  Suburban blacks, and to a lesser 
extent suburban Hispanics, therefore over-participate in Open Choice at a rate even 
higher than that at which they over-participate in the magnet schools.179  Clustering by 
race is further visible in the New Haven schools that the suburban participants choose to 
attend.  Overall, about three-quarters (74.5%) of the suburban Open Choice participants 
attend the Conte/West Hills School.180  All but one of the white students (90.9%) attends 
the Conte/West Hills School, which is 14.7% white.181  By contrast, only 66.7% of the 
black and 72.3% of the Hispanic students choose to attend Conte/West Hills.182  Instead, 
the remaining minority students attend Wexler Grant (1.4% white, with 7 minority Open 
Choice participants), James Hillhouse (1.6% white, 2 minority Open Choice participants), 
and Wilbur Cross (10.6% white, with 4 minority participants and the remaining 1 white 
participant).183  Admittedly, the number of attendees is so small that one should be 
cautious about drawing strong conclusions from them; however, to the extent that one 
                                                 
177 Though 90% of the program’s participants are New Haveners who attend school in the suburbs, the 
program also serves some students (52 in 2006-07) who come to New Haven from the suburbs to attend a 
New Haven school that does not participate in the interdistrict magnet school program. Open Choice Data, 
supra note 86. The Open Choice law provides that students from suburban districts may attend school in 
the “priority school district” (in this case, New Haven), provided that the participating students contribute 
to the racial, ethnic, and economic diversity of the priority district and do not increase the district’s racial, 
ethnic, or economic isolation. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266aa(c).  Suburban students that participate in Open 
Choice cannot attend interdistrict magnet schools through the program, and are thus not counted among the 
population of interdistrict magnet school participants above. 
178 Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  There are no Asian or American Indian participants from the 
suburbs. 
179 By comparison, the population of magnet school students from the suburbs is 48.3% black, 15.5% 
Hispanic, 33.6% white. New Haven Magnet School Data, supra note 80.  It is unlikely that the Open 
Choice lottery, however structured, favors suburban minority students over suburban white students, since 
to do so would go against the statutory requirement that the lottery not exacerbate pre-existing ethnic, 
racial, or economic segregation. 
180 Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  The Conte/West Hills Magnet School does not participate in the 
general interdistrict magnet school lottery but accepts some students from the suburbs (about 6% of its 
students in 2006-07) through the Open Choice program.  Id. 
181 Id.; Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100 
182 Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
183 Id.; Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100. 
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may draw conclusions, this data reflects the broader pattern of whites and blacks 
choosing schools based on the percentage of white or African-American students present 
there. 
 Data on New Haven residents’ participation in Open Choice complicates the 
analysis, because black New Haven residents actually over-participate in Open Choice, 
even though this means leaving New Haven for a school district with a smaller 
percentage of African-Americans.  Among participating New Haven residents, 71.2% are 
black, 16.8% are Hispanic, and 9.2% are white.184  Compared to their overall 
participation rates in the New Haven public school system (including magnet schools), 
blacks are overrepresented (71% to 54%), while Hispanics are very underrepresented 
(17% to 34%) and whites participate at similar rates (9% vs. 11%).185  Certainly, this data 
accords with the higher academic quality of suburban schools as a factor in school choice 
of members of all races.  But does it accord with our expectation from the magnet schools 
data that blacks might be less interested than whites in attending suburban schools where 
blacks will be small in numbers? 
 I believe that it does.  First, magnet schools are a limited option—only about 15% 
of New Haven residents get to attend a magnet school, and the magnet schools are 
oversubscribed.186  Presumably, most of the black Open Choice participants did not have 
                                                 
184 Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
185 Id.; Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45. 
186 I was not able to obtain data on the number of participants or acceptance rates for the magnet schools 
lottery in recent years.  However, in 2000-01, approximately 800 New Haven rising ninth graders (about 
60-65% of eligible public school-enrolled New Haveners) applied to attend a magnet high school.  Adam 
Goldfarb, New Haven’s Interdistrict Schools of Choice: New Hope for Racial Integration 25 (Apr. 15, 
2002) (unpublished Senior Essay, Yale University) (on file with author) (citing Interview with Ed Linehan, 
Director, New Haven Magnet Schools (Nov. 28, 2000)).  270 of these students (34% of applicants) were 
granted admission, making admission to the magnet high schools quite competitive.  Id.  See also Joseph P. 
Viteritti, Defining Equity: Politics Markets, and Public Policy, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 
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the option to attend a magnet school, and a suburban public school may seem, whatever 
its population, like a more attractive option than a non-magnet New Haven public school.  
Therefore, the data could still be consistent with an aggregate decision-making hierarchy 
among black families that values suburban public schools below New Haven magnet 
schools but above New Haven non-magnet public schools. 
 Second, Open Choice provides an alternative to prohibitively expensive private 
schools that may be attractive to both white and black New Haven families seeking an 
alternative to traditional public schools.  As discussed, the 40% of New Haven whites 
who have already chosen private school as an option may not enroll in Open Choice 
unless they first attend public school for a year, which likely prevents them from 
realizing the advantage of this option.  Because black and Hispanic families attend 
private school at much lower rates, they are more likely to be eligible for Open Choice.187  
Still, given that differences in private school attendance rates by race hold when income 
is taken into account, it appears that even for those New Haven African-American 
families who could afford private school, a well-regarded suburban public school may be 
relatively more attractive to an African-American family than a private school, as 
compared with an Open Choice-eligible white family of similar income facing the same 
choice. 
 While the above discussion explains why African-Americans might participate in 
Open Choice programs to secure a better education despite the racial make-up of the 
suburban schools they enter, a clustering analysis would still predict that, within the 
confines of availability, blacks participating in Open Choice would be more attracted to 
                                                                                                                                                 
13, 22 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003) (noting “significant unmet demand for expanded public and private school 
choice” around the country, and that most forms of school choice have long waiting lists). 
187 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text. 
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those schools with a larger African-American population.188  The data on where Open 
Choice participants from New Haven actually choose to attend school bears this 
conclusion out.189  Hamden, one of the top three receiving districts in the Open Choice 
program, has the highest percent minority student population among the top three 
participating suburban districts.190  Consistent with clustering, more black Open Choice 
participants go to Hamden than any other district (29.1% of black participants).191  
Additionally, whites go most frequently to North Haven (51.3% of white participants), 
significantly the district among the top three with the smallest percent minority 
population.192  No whites go to Hamden through Open Choice.193 
Looking beyond the top receivers of black and white students complicates things 
a bit, but not inexplicably so.  Blacks do send their children, after Hamden, to the 
predominantly white districts of Wallingford (24.8%) and North Haven (17.2%).194  Yet 
even though Wallingford and North Haven have small black populations, Hamden, 
Wallingford, and North Haven are the top three participating districts, and participating 
students are at the mercy of which suburban districts decide to make slots available.  The 
                                                 
188 Cf. Hawke, supra note 176, at 620 (discussing a study that speculated that urban minorities in Iowa 
participated less in open enrollment than white students out of hesitation to attend mostly white schools and 
a lack of information about the program). 
189 The racial breakdown of the suburban districts discussed here includes current Open Choice 
participants.  I have chosen to include them since a new student choosing to participate in Open Choice 
would perceive the district’s racial composition as it is with the Open Choice participants, not without 
them. 
190 The three largest receiving districts are Wallingford (101 students), Hamden (97 students), and North 
Haven (92 students), which together educate 68% of the 424 New Haven residents who participate in Open 
Choice.  No other district takes more than 24 students.  Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  Hamden’s 
school district is 52.7% white, 30.7% black, 11.3% Hispanic, and 5.2% Asian.  Connecticut 2005-06 
District SSP, supra note 45.   
191 Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
192 Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  North Haven’s school district is 85.5% white, 6.9% Asian, 4.0% 
black, and 3.4% Hispanic. Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45. 
193 Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
194 Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  Whites’ second choice is also Wallingford, where 20.5% of 
participating New Haven whites attend.  Id. 
Interdistrict School Choice: Clustering in Action 68
fact that close to a third of the black students go to Hamden, while not a single white 
student does, suggests that when given the choice among suburban districts, blacks will 
be much more likely than whites to send their children to a district with a critical mass of 
blacks.  Also, because not all participants can go to Hamden, some black families will 
take advantage of the opportunity to send their child to a relatively wealthy suburban 
district even if it does not have a critical mass of blacks.  In other words, black choice 
likely reflects the interplay of three constraining factors, while white choice likely 
reflects only the first two: a) the available number of slots; b) the wealth of the district; 
and c) whether or not a critical mass of blacks exists in the district.  Overall, the observed 
pattern demonstrates that even within the constraints of a small number of participants 
and a small handful of participating districts, there are observable differences in the way 
school choice gets exercised among white and black participants. 
 
D. Effects of Open Choice and the Interdistrict Magnet Schools on Suburban Districts 
Even though it involves many fewer students, Open Choice may be more radical 
than the magnet schools because of its potential effects on school integration in suburban 
districts.  Though students attending a suburban public school through Open Choice 
constitute only 1-3% or less of the suburban districts’ total student population in 
participating districts, the program has nevertheless caused a significant increase in the 
population of black students in several of the suburban districts where the black 
population of the school district is less than 5%: 
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Open Choice Effect on Black Population in Suburban Districts with 





























































Even with such small numbers, Open Choice can help expose suburban students to a 
range of diverse classmates with whom they would not otherwise come into contact.  
Over time, as Open Choice continues to expand, it may help facilitate the advent of a 
critical mass of black students in suburban districts beyond the four in the New Haven 
region—Hamden, West Haven, Ansonia, and Derby—that already have a significant 
black presence. 
 For a time, it looked as though the interdistrict magnet schools may have had a 
stabilizing—that is, anti-integrative—effect on the minority population in certain 
suburban districts.  A study by Adam Goldfarb examined the populations of the high 
schools in West Haven and Hamden, the top two participating districts and the districts 
with the largest minority populations.196  Goldfarb concluded that after a period of 
                                                 
195 Data calculated using Open Choice Data, supra note 86, and Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra 
note 45. 
196 Goldfarb, supra note 186, at 66-67. 
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significant growth in their minority populations after 1990, the percentage minority in 
both districts appeared to level off starting in 1995-96, the year that the first New Haven 
interdistrict magnet schools opened their doors to suburban students: 










































































































Recent data, however, as detailed in the charts, reveals that any leveling was only 
temporary.  Minority growth in the West Haven school system did cease for about six 
years, and in Hamden for about three years, but since around 1999-00 in Hamden and 
                                                 
197 These charts, with data through the 2000-01 school year, originally appeared in Goldfarb, supra note 
186, at 66-67.  Included in the “% Minority” are all non-white students.  Goldfarb surmised that the 
minority population of these two districts had “leveled off” thanks to the availability of interdistrict magnet 
schools. Id.  I have expanded these charts through the 2005-06 school year, the latest data available, which 
reveals that any such stabilization was only temporary.  See Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 
100.  My thanks to Adam Goldfarb for permission to use and expand upon his charts. 
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2002-03 in West Haven, the minority population has started to rise again.  Therefore, 
while the interdistrict magnet schools may have had a temporary stabilizing effect on the 
minority student population of these inner suburban districts as the magnet schools 
absorbed some of the districts’ students, the most recent trends suggest that the minority 
student population in these districts will likely continue to grow over time. 
 
III. Frameworks for Evaluating New Haven’s Cross-Boundary Programs and 
Lessons for School Policy 
 
 In Part II, I present an empirical analysis of cross-boundary school choice 
programs as they operate in New Haven, Connecticut.  This analysis finds that with 
regard to the interdistrict magnet schools, suburban white and black residents participate 
at significantly different rates.  Across districts, suburban blacks and whites are guided by 
some similar motivations in choosing whether or not to participate, but blacks are 
disproportionately more likely to participate in every district, particularly in those 
districts where they are token in numbers.  As a result of these choices, interdistrict 
magnet schools have greater levels of racial integration than traditional New Haven 
public schools, but not nearly as much as would be expected were race not a factor 
governing participants’ determinations of whether or not to participate.  Part II also looks 
at the factors motivating Open Choice participants.  Like magnet school attendees, Open 
Choice participants want to attend good schools, and where given the choice, black Open 
Choice participants seek out schools where they will not be token in numbers.  Given Part 
II’s findings, this Part seeks to normatively evaluate the cross-boundary programs, 
employing frameworks from law and economics, social capital, and political economy to 
help make sense of the observed phenomena and to illuminate the potential and 
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limitations of the contributions that cross-boundary school choice programs can make to 
education policy. 
 
A. The Benefits and Disadvantages of Expanded Choice 
Law and economics provides a useful framework for assessing the value to be 
placed on individual choice.  As a descriptive starting point, this utilitarian perspective 
assumes that individuals will generally make self-maximizing choices that are most 
beneficial to themselves, based on their own exogenous preferences.198  The law and 
economics perspective also assumes that under most circumstances, individual self-
maximizing choice will result in collective benefit.  It also acknowledges, however, that 
individuals may sometimes not fully take their own interests into account, or that their 
choices may have harmful effects on society that individual interest does not take into 
account.  Where individuals do not take their own interests into account, society should 
exercise paternalistic restrictions on individual choice to benefit that individual;199 where 
the effects of individual choice result in negative externalities that are not internalized by 
the individual making the choice, society may need to restrict that choice to avoid 
societal harm, or at least find a way to make the individual internalize the externality.200 
The exercise of school choice has many potential benefits.  Proponents have 
argued that school choice can make schools more efficient through competition; give 
children an opportunity to attend a superior school they would not otherwise be able to 
                                                 
198 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10-11 (3d. ed. 2003). 
199 See Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 3 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) (“[T]he principle 
of legal paternalism justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm or, in its extreme 
version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own good.”). 
200 The concept of externalities is famously treated in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. 
LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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attend; provide a greater level of autonomy for children and parents; improve parental 
and student satisfaction; remedy structural flaws in the over-bureaucratization of public 
education; and give low-income parents a form of choice that wealthy families have 
always had.201  The potential for these benefits exists in most forms of choice, including 
in the case of Connecticut’s cross-boundary school choice options. 
Connecticut’s cross-boundary remedies have additional, particular benefits for the 
well-being of black children in schools.  Suburban black families may choose to have 
their children exit a situation where they are token in numbers to avoid having them be an 
isolated and discriminated-against minority in a suburban public school.  Suburban 
schools, however great the academic opportunities they may offer, can be a situs of racial 
prejudice and violence, and racial dynamics in even a well-regarded suburban school may 
nevertheless prove detrimental to the mental health and achievement of an isolated 
minority student.202  Of course, some suburban dwellers may scoff at the idea that a 
student would voluntarily choose to attend a New Haven magnet school over a suburban 
public school.203  But the observed exercise of preference suggests that for certain black 
students, attending a New Haven magnet school constitutes a superior school option as 
compared with facing racial isolation in a suburban public school. 
                                                 
201 See PETER TICE ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF ED., TRENDS IN 
THE USE OF SCHOOL CHOICE: 1993 TO 2003, at 40 (2006) ; Stephen Eisdorfer, Public School Choice and 
Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 940 (1993).  Wealthy families have historically exercised 
choice through moving or sending their children to private schools, two options that may not be available to 
lower-income families. Eisdorfer, supra. 
202 See Barnes, supra note 17, at 2387 (contending that black kids in suburban schools often experience 
“prolonged isolation” and “denigrating racial imagery,” as well as “tracking, low expectations, or race 
hatred.”);  
203 See Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2049 & n.17 (“[M]any suburbanities select the suburbs precisely 
because they want to separate themselves from urban residents and urban problems . . . including problems 
in urban schools.”). 
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Relatedly, school choice provides options for families to individualize their 
children’s education.  Moving to Opportunity found—dishearteningly for its 
researchers—that not all African-American children were better off for having moved 
from city to suburban neighborhoods.  Indeed, African-American males fared worse in 
suburban environments than in their original city environments.204  By providing school 
choice for suburban African-American residents, the Connecticut plans give middle-class 
black families the valuable option of moving to the suburbs and continuing to send one or 
more of their children to a high quality public school in the city.  An individual family 
can even send different children to different places, or send an individual child to one 
place for elementary school and another place for high school.  If a family believes that 
some or all of its children will do better in a predominantly minority educational 
environment but nevertheless prefer other benefits of suburban life like safety or high-
quality housing, it no longer needs to choose between the two.205 
 Even if they do not fear that their children will do poorly in a suburban school, 
black families may also be choosing to have their children exit a situation where they are 
token in numbers out of a desire to have their children grow up with and socialize with 
other African-American children.  Undoubtedly owing in part to being victims of group-
based historical and ongoing discrimination, researchers have found that African-
                                                 
204 Kling, Liebman, & Katz, supra note 16. 
205 Even with the availability of magnet schools, suburban living may still not be ideal for some African-
American middle class families.  As Barnes points out, middle class blacks who move to middle class white 
environments often find the longed-for security elusive.  Barnes, supra note 17, at 2391.  A family may 
regret its move but having purchased a house, may not consider it viable to return to the city.  The magnet 
schools may provide such a family with a more ideal learning environment for its children as it adjusts to 
the benefits and disadvantages of suburban living.  See Barnes, supra note 17, at 2391-93; cf. ELLEN, supra 
note 42, at 54-55 (explaining that households with children are less likely to move rapidly than other 
households). 
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Americans exhibit a high level of cultural and community-based cohesion.206  For 
example, researchers have documented that even as African-Americans have migrated in 
increasing numbers to the suburbs, many will return to the city to attend church 
services.207  This finding complements the arguments of Sheryll Cashin and others, 
discussed above, that middle class black families value the benefits of suburban life such 
as safety and high quality housing stock, but also want to maintain close ties with other 
black families.  Like the choice to attend a city-based church, suburban black families 
may deliberately choose the option of magnet schools for their children because such 
schools provide African-American families who have moved to the suburbs an 
opportunity to maintain a strong connection with the black community.  If true, this 
phenomenon suggests that the creation of these school attendance options for their 
children allows suburban African-American families to take advantage of the benefits of 
suburban life without losing ties to the African-American community. 
 Having the choice to attend school with suburban students also benefits the New 
Haven residents who participate in Open Choice and who make up a large majority of the 
population (70%) of the interdistrict magnet schools.  The addition of the suburban 
population increases the socioeconomic diversity of the magnet schools, bringing them 
closer to being “middle class” schools and benefiting the New Haveners that attend 
                                                 
206 See Timothy Bledsoe et. al, Residential Context and Racial Solidarity Among African Americans, 39 
AM. J. POL’Y SCI. 434 (1995) (analyzing factors contributing to black racial solidarity).  Bledsoe’s analysis 
shows, however, that suburban blacks in integrated areas exhibit lower levels of black solidarity than those 
who remain in more segregated areas. Id. at 449. 
207 In this way, they may retain ties to the traditional heart of the black community in the city.  As one 
scholar points out, “For black professionals who worked in overwhelming white settings, the cultural 
comfort of these [inner-city] black churches provided therapeutic relief from the micropolitics of being 
black in a white and unpredictably hostile world . . .” Cheryl Townsend Gilkes, Plenty Good Room: 
Adaptation in a Changing Black Church, 558 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL’Y & SOC. SCI. 101, 108 (1998). 
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them.208  Open Choice gives an opportunity to a limited number of students who could 
not afford or do not want to move to the suburbs but nevertheless desire to attend school 
there.   
Despite the benefits of interdistrict school choice, there may nevertheless be 
reasons to restrict such choice because the individuals exercising it may not fully take 
their own or society’s interests into account.  First, integration in suburban schools has a 
social benefit, and by contributing to segregation, the choice of black families to have 
their children leave the suburbs to attend school may harm those children and white 
children who remain in suburban schools, as well as have negative effects on the racial 
polarization of American society more broadly.209  Second, being a token in a largely-
white suburban district may be difficult and undesirable, but once a district attains a 
critical mass of black students, opportunities are created for many more black students in 
the future.  Thus, individual choices may have a negative externality in that these choices 
may harm future black students by depriving them of the opportunity to comfortably 
attend the suburban school. 
The data lends some support to these fears.  As Part II demonstrates, black 
families living in suburban districts where blacks have attained a critical mass exercise 
school choice somewhat differently than those in non-critical mass districts.  In 
particular, their choices about whether or not to send their children to an interdistrict 
magnet school tend to mirror those of whites much more closely than in districts where 
                                                 
208 See Appendix A for details on the individual interdistrict magnet schools.  Studies show that students of 
all races and socioeconomic levels perform better in “middle class” schools—that is, schools where fewer 
than 50% of the students come from low-income families. Lewin, supra note 71, at 97, 125-129. 
209 See CASHIN, supra note 9, at 81 (contending that integration, though not necessarily assimilation, 
provides best route to equal opportunity for everyone); Liu & Taylor, supra note 4, at 791-92 (arguing for 
the virtues of desegregated public schools and noting that for education to serve its purposes, it cannot take 
place in a “legalized caste system”). 
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blacks have not achieved a critical mass, suggesting that once blacks achieve a critical 
mass in a suburban district, the desire to exit that district to attend an interdistrict magnet 
school is no longer as disproportionately attractive.  For blacks, achieving critical mass in 
a suburban district may thus bring a social benefit not unlike that gained by attending an 
interdistrict magnet school—the end of isolation and the chance to interact with other 
black students in the school environment.  Achieving a critical mass may also help 
change white attitudes, facilitating increased opportunities for black students in the long 
run.210  For whites, having a critical mass of black students in a district will provide them 
with exposure to black students and the opportunity to form relationships that help 
undermine the stereotypes that hold back broader racial progress.211  Yet blacks who 
choose to leave suburban districts in which they are not a critical mass to attend 
interdistrict magnet schools help delay the achievement of a critical mass and its 
associated benefits in that town, and in the short term burden those black students who 
remain in that town’s public schools.  For this reason, it may be in the long-term interests 
of blacks and whites alike for society to restrict the exercise of interdistrict choice by 
suburban dwellers. 
Though interdistrict magnet schools provide a new twist, liberal critics of school 
choice plans have long predicted that school choice options, if not structured or restricted 
by race, will exacerbate segregation and further isolate poor African-Americans in failing 
city schools.  School choice does have an ignominious history in this regard.  In the South 
in the wake of Brown, school boards developed “freedom of choice” plans that 
                                                 
210 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-333 (2003) (discussing the extensive benefits of having a 
critical mass in educational institutions). 
211 See id. 
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exacerbated segregation in the guise of fulfilling (white) parental preferences.212  When 
the Supreme Court held these plans insufficient to comply with Brown’s mandates and 
federal district courts began to force southern public schools to desegregate, whites 
created a series of relatively inexpensive private schools in order to give white parents a 
segregated school choice option.213 
A chorus of scholars continues to voice fears about the segregating effects of 
school choice plans.  In a recent article on the school choice provisions of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001, Nick Lewin explained that freer choice will inevitably lead to 
increased segregation a result of several sets of interconnected choices.  Lewin and others 
predict that under choice plans, white parents will tend to send their children to schools 
with more white, wealthier students, while minority parents will choose schools in lower-
income neighborhoods with poorer, lower-income students.214  He contends that poor and 
minority students would be less likely to transfer schools even as the most talented 
students at the top “skim[]” themselves off to better schools.215  Because students of all 
races and socioeconomic levels perform better in “middle class” schools, allowing 
uncontrolled choice and the inevitable self-segregation that accompanies it will harm 
those students who remain behind in the failing schools.216 
 On balance, though, the fears of critics appear not to support restricting the ability 
of suburban families to choose interdistrict magnet schools.  In the short run, some of 
their fears may be correct, insofar as transfers to attend interdistrict magnet schools may 
                                                 
212 See Eisdorfer, supra note 201, at 939; Levin, supra note 156, at 266-69.  The Supreme Court held these 
plans inadequate to fulfill the constitutional requirements of Brown in Green v. County School Bd. Of New 
Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
213 Ryan, supra note 30, at 1637 
214 Lewin, supra note 71, at 113; see also, e.g., Hawke, supra note 176; Levin, supra note 156, at 280-81. 
215 Lewin, supra note 71, at 114, 121. 
216 Id. at 97, 125-129. 
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decrease the diversity of suburban districts.  Yet unlike the zero-sum intradistrict choice 
contemplated by Lewin (and the No Child Left Behind Act), interdistrict choice has the 
positive benefit of increasing the racial and socioeconomic diversity of the New Haven 
city school district by bringing relatively wealthy white and minority suburban students 
who would not otherwise be attending city schools into the New Haven school system.  
Additionally, the option of magnet schools may actually incentivize some African-
Americans to move to the suburbs from the city,217 further integrating suburban towns 
and districts in the long run.  If a black family with multiple children moves to the 
suburbs in part because of the availability of interdistrict magnet schools, and sends some 
of its children to a suburban public school and others to an interdistrict magnet school, it 
contributes more to the achievement of a critical mass in that suburban district than if the 
family had not moved at all.  Even if a black family moves to the suburbs and sends all of 
its children to interdistrict magnet schools, the increased presence of black families in the 
town may make the town a more desirable location for other black families218 who 
themselves may then choose to send one or more of their children to the suburban public 
school.219 
                                                 
217 Cf. Henig & Sugarman, supra note 62, at 13-16 (explaining that American households with young 
children move at particularly high rates, and that school selection is a primary driving factor behind 
families’ residential choice decisions). 
218 See ELLEN, supra note 42, at 56-58 (explaining that blacks choosing neighborhoods in which to move 
often cluster in locations where there are other blacks, a phenomenon which may be driven to an extent by 
the desire of blacks to avoid neighborhoods where they will feel unwelcome). 
219 By improving school options available to city residents, interdistrict magnet schools may also 
incentivize middle class families of all races to remain in the city.  School choice advocates have frequently 
stressed this rationale for expanding choice options in urban districts.  See GILL ET AL., supra note 60, at 
161 (“[T]he most visionary advocates of choice hope that it will help to undermine residential segregation 
and reverse middle-class flight by giving families in all neighborhoods a number of high-quality 
educational options.”).  As discussed in Part II, the New Haven interdistrict magnet schools may in fact 
have helped slow down the exodus of white families from the public school system.  However, given that at 
present demand for the New Haven resident slots in the interdistrict magnet schools significantly outstrips 
supply, middle class families in New Haven will not be able to count on the availability of a magnet school 
slot for their children absent considerable expansion of the magnet schools.  At present, therefore, it is 
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B. Bridging versus Bonding Social Capital 
 The concept of social capital also provides a useful framework for identifying 
some of the potential benefits and harms of cross-boundary programs.  Though the term 
has no consensus definition, social capital generally refers to the value that social 
networks and associational groups provide in fostering democracy and human 
productivity through bringing people together for social relations, community building, 
and the achievement of common purposes.220  Exploring the present-day state of 
American associational life in Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community, political scientist Robert Putnam drew on the work of earlier theorists in 
highlighting and exploring two constituents of social capital: bridging social capital and 
bonding social capital.221  Bonding social capital refers to the cohesion that forms 
internal to a particular group, while bridging social capital refers to the networks of bonds 
across groups.  Both are interdependent and necessary for individual and societal well-
being, yet inward-looking bonding social capital can also cause harms when it reinforces 
“exclusive identities and homogenous groups,” or creates “out-group antagonism” that 
operates to the detriment of society, even if it has some benefits for the individuals 
involved.222  Putnam notes these negatives, but also recognizes that bonding social capital 
contributes to collective well-being by helping individuals affirm personal identities and 
commitments.223 
                                                                                                                                                 
unlikely that the availability of interdistrict magnet schools will incentivize families to remain in New 
Haven unless they have already secured a spot for their child(ren) in those schools. 
220 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 18-
19 (2000). 
221 Id. at 22. 
222 Id.at 22-23. 
223 Id. 
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 In a society that still remains quite segregated, the magnet schools help mitigate 
what may be a high social cost of moving to the suburbs for some African-American 
families.  In the language of Putnam, for some suburban Africans-Americans their 
capacity to fully participate in an activity that fosters bridging social capital—helping to 
integrate a suburb—may depend on them having access to a sufficient level of bonding 
social capital so they can, in Cashin’s words, partake in the “fundamentally human 
tendency to seek community among people who are familiar to us” despite living in a 
town where African-Americans form a small minority.224  By providing the ability for 
both urban and suburban African-American children to attend a high-quality school with 
other African-American children, the magnet schools can help foster bonding social 
capital within the black community, while not forcing middle class blacks to choose 
between having the benefits associated with suburban living and having ties to the black 
community. 
Yet cross-boundary school choice programs might also harm the potential for 
bridging social capital.  Society has a positive interest in the bridging social capital that 
comes with having heterogeneous and integrated suburban school environments.225  The 
chance to form bonds across heterogeneous lines, which Putnam identifies as key to 
American social progress,226 may be undermined by the self-segregation that the magnet 
schools permit and perhaps even foster among suburban students of different races.  
Nevertheless, the interdistrict magnet schools themselves show evidence of fostering 
bridging social capital in several ways.  First, as suggested in the previous Section, the 
                                                 
224 CASHIN, supra note 9, at 25. 
225 See Liu & Taylor, supra note 4, at 791-92 (discussing civic, economic, and social benefits of 
desegregated schools). 
226 See PUTNAM, supra note 220, at 23, 28. 
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existence of the interdistrict magnet schools may help incentivize some African-
American families to move to the suburbs.  Even if these families send all their children 
to an interdistrict magnet school, they nevertheless will interact with their neighbors and 
may otherwise participate in the civic affairs of their new town—itself a form of bridging 
social capital that the magnet schools indirectly help to foster.  Second, the interdistrict 
magnet schools foster bridging social capital between the relatively well-off suburban 
attendees of various races, on the one hand, and the relatively poor, mostly minority 
urban attendees on the other.227  By far the most integrated of the New Haven schools—
along race, socioeconomic, and geographic lines—the interdistrict magnet schools have 
particular potential for fostering bridging social capital among individuals from across 
the region. 
The Open Choice program may bridge social capital across race and class lines to 
an even greater extent than the magnet schools do.  In the short term, it does so by 
creating more integration across race, class, and geographic lines in suburban schools.  In 
the long term, by facilitating the achievement of a critical mass of black students in 
suburban districts, it has the potential to foster an even greater degree of bridging social 
capital along similar lines.  Finally, by smoothing the road for black students to attend  
the school in the future, the Open Choice pioneers may help create bonding social capital 
within the black community. 
It is difficult to weigh the positive and negative contributions of school choice on 
bridging and bonding social capital.  The actual extent to which the magnet schools foster 
                                                 
227 Putnam points out the extent to which many groups bridge and bond across different social dimensions 
at the same time.  He specifically identifies the example of the black church, which “brings together people 
of the same race and religion across class lines.” Id. at 23.  The interdistrict magnet schools take this 
example one step further, creating bonding social capital between African-Americans across class lines as 
well as whites and African-Americans across race and class lines. 
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community among blacks cannot easily be assessed, and the extent to which the magnet 
schools facilitate an increased African-American presence in suburban towns and schools 
cannot be determined, if at all, until the program has existed for a longer period of time.  
Furthermore, even if the extent of these effects could be determined, it would be difficult 
to quantify the relative values of facilitating black-white integration, maintaining bonds 
in the black community, and educational achievement.  While Putnam’s framework 
offers a means to understand the competing social values at stake in the development of 
school choice programs, competing effects on the program of different types of bridging 
and bonding social capital make an overall evaluation difficult. 
 
C. Tools from Political Economy 
 Thus far, this paper has examined cross-boundary programs primarily from the 
perspective of the opportunities they provide for urban and suburban students and how 
they have affected the racial makeup of urban and suburban schools.  Yet policy is never 
a zero sum game, and in many areas cross-boundary programs have met political 
opposition.228 
Literature from political science and economics can help illuminate both the 
descriptive conditions under which attempts to implement cross-boundary programs will 
likely be met with support or opposition, and the normative considerations that should 
shape an evaluation of such programs from a political economy perspective.  Supporters 
of such programs, including the plaintiffs in Sheff, articulate a powerful argument for 
why those concerned with the problems of urban education and the harmful effects of 
segregation should support cross-boundary programs.  This paper suggests additional 
                                                 
228 See infra Subsection III.C.1. 
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reasons why these programs might be in the general interest of suburban African-
Americans.  Critics of these programs, on the other hand, might reasonably fear that by 
opening up well-regarded suburban school districts to outsiders, these programs will 
undermine the quality of those districts without producing any measurable benefit for the 
programs’ participants.  Critics focusing on interests of urban students in particular might 
also question whether the massive resources spent on cross-boundary programs, 
including transportation costs, might be better spent on reducing class sizes or creating 
charter-type schools in the urban district itself, which have less integrative potential but 
might be able to benefit a greater share of the urban student body.229  This Section will 
explore these various perspectives, the normative premises they embody, and the 
conclusions they support.  While the arguments for each perspective have compelling 
elements and are worthy of discussion and understanding, none of them completely 
address the objections the others’ raise or provide a fully persuasive account of how we 
should view cross-boundary school choice programs. 
 
(i) The Tiebout Critique and the Sheff Rejoinder 
Writing in local government economics offers a coherent platform from which to 
mount a critique of cross-boundary remedies that open up suburban schools to urban 
students; as a descriptive matter, it also explains why proposals for such remedies may 
meet opposition.  To understand this literature and possible solutions to the problems it 
                                                 
229 See EDUCATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE, FOCUS ON RESULTS: AN ACADEMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE 
KNOWLEDGE IS POWER PROGRAM (2005), available at http://www.educationalpolicy.org/pdf/KIPP.pdf 
(discussing benefits of highly acclaimed charter schools run by the “Knowledge is Power Program”); GILL 
ET AL., supra note 60, at 164 (discussing benefits of charter schools, despite their segregation); Kevin 
Brown, The Supreme Court’s Role in the Growing School Choice Movement, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 37, 59 
(2006) (explaining that charter schools tend to be more segregated than normal public schools, but at least 
provide choice); Liu & Taylor, supra note 4, at 800-01 (noting that creating charter schools does not 
facilitate desegregation). 
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poses, it is useful to divide the perceived threats posed by the entrance into suburban 
schools of low-income and minority children from the city into two separated but 
interrelated types.  One type is physical—the perception by suburban residents that the 
presence of outsiders in the suburban school will itself be a threat to the school’s quality.  
The other is financial—the notion that in a regime where schools are primarily funded 
through local property taxes, access to those schools by outsiders can cause a free-riding 
problem. 
Expanding upon the theoretical model of local expenditures first proposed by 
Charles Tiebout,230 economist Bruce Hamilton argued controversially in 1975 that 
maintaining the quality of suburban services depended on individual communities being 
able to maintain an economically homogenous population, which required excluding poor 
entrants through exclusionary zoning.231  Hamilton’s focus was on the financial threat—
that low-income “free-riders,” if able to inexpensively enter a community, would take 
community benefits without adequately contributing funds of their own.232  In the cross-
boundary context, Hamilton’s analysis may not be directly applicable to outsiders 
entering the schools of a suburban community but living elsewhere,233 particularly if, as 
with Open Choice, the state or their home district provides funds to the receiving district 
to mitigate any resulting financial loss.  However, William Fischel’s work, The 
Homevoter Hypothesis, suggests that outsider access may pose a financial threat by 
reducing property values in the receiving community.234  Giving life to the dynamic 
                                                 
230 Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1954). 
231 Bruce Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 
(1975). 
232 Id. at 205. 
233 See Berry, supra note 39, at 257. 
234 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
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identified by Tiebout and Hamilton, Fischel hypothesizes that “homevoters” act on the 
civic and political stage against perceived threats to their home values.235  As long as the 
value of unique local-based goods—like a high-quality school district—remains available 
only to residents of a particular locality, it will get capitalized into the values of homes in 
that locality.236  As a result, even those middle class homeowners who do not have 
children in the schools will act to preserve the quality and exclusivity of their schools, 
because the value of their largest, most undiversified asset—their home—depends on 
maintaining a high quality school to which those outside the locality cannot gain 
access.237  If access becomes universal, then others will not need to pay the premium 
home price in a given district in order to gain access to that district’s schools.  Property 
values may therefore decline, even if quality stays high. 
From a normative perspective, the Tiebout/Fischel model fails to acknowledge the 
significant externalities that self-segregation and sorting by whites imposes on those low-
income and minority individuals on the other side of that sorting.  The Sheff court spoke 
about the harms sorting itself had caused, holding that the state had a constitutional 
obligation to remedy “the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as 
poverty” have had on public schoolchildren in Hartford.238  The court contended that 
these harms, though unintentional, resulted directly from a 1909 statute that made school 
district boundaries coterminous with town boundaries, facilitating a system under which 
                                                 
235 Id. at 72-80. 
236 Id. at 39-46, 149. Econometric work has confirmed that home values reflect the quality of a district’s 
schools. See id. at 154-155 (discussing differing home values and school district quality in Hempstead & 
Garden City, neighboring municipalities in Long Island, New York); William T. Bogart & Brian A. 
Cromwell, How Much Is a Neighborhood School Worth?, 47 J. URB. ECON. 280 (2000) (discussing the 
significant extent to which neighborhood school quality is capitalized into home values in Shaker Heights, 
Ohio). 
237 FISCHEL, supra note 234, at 1, 4, 39-46, 149, 154-55. 
238 See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270-72 (Conn. 1996). 
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town governments had significant political and fiscal autonomy as well as responsibility 
for schooling.239  By granting localities significant independence within their own 
boundaries, suburban residents had had little need to contribute financially to address 
social problems in other localities.240  In identifying the school districting statute as the 
source of the isolation, the Sheff court gave voice to the dark side of Tiebout sorting 
dynamics.  Namely, within the context of a political structure that values local autonomy, 
families acting in a rationally self-maximizing way move to more expensive localities 
and maintain the financial exclusivity of those localities, generating negative externalities 
that harm those left behind.241  Furthermore, the Sheff court insisted that the negative 
effects of racial and ethnic isolation affected everyone, not just minority children in the 
cities.  The Sheff court thus concluded that a cross-boundary remedy would be in the 
broad public interest because “a more integrated public school system would likely be 
beneficial to all schoolchildren.”242 
In identifying the districting statute and the resulting racial and economic 
isolation as the main source of harm, and directing the legislature to calibrate its remedy 
to address that harm, the Sheff court spoke directly to the normative incompleteness of 
                                                 
239 Id. at 1274, 1289. 
240 This independence may be a virtue or a vice, depending on one’s perspective.  Compare FISCHEL, supra 
note 234, at 39-40 (“[I]f one wants to maintain what I see as the virtues of local government, reforms 
should not attempt to divorce the collection of taxes from the decisions to spend and regulate.”), with Alan 
Wolfe, The Irony of School Choice: Liberals, Conservatives, and the New Politics of Race, in SCHOOL 
CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE, supra note 186, at 31, 47 (advocating the delinking of school finance from 
property taxes in order to enhance equity across school districts), and Stephen D. Sugarman, School Choice 
and Public Funding, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW, supra 
note 55, at 111 (contending that expanding public school choice for low-income families will undermine 
the link between the local tax base and local public school, and in turn may help pave way for broader 
equality-based school funding reforms that Sugarman considers desirable). 
241 Cf. CASHIN, supra note 9, at 104-124 (describing the broad and enduring harms to African-Americans 
caused by economically rational separatist behavior on the part of whites). 
242 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273.  But see Barnes, supra note 17, at 2385 (contending that the Sheff court 
wrongfully viewed racial isolation as harmful to minorities in the city but not to all of Connecticut’s 
schoolchildren). 
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the Tiebout model.  However, the Sheff court failed to address the potential detrimental 
effects of cross-boundary remedies that Hamilton and Fischel articulate: cutting the link 
between local control and suburban schools reduces the incentives of local residents to 
monitor and care about the quality of their schools, causing those schools to decrease in 
quality.  In passing, the Sheff court did note that rationales in support of the districting 
scheme held unconstitutional included that it “further[ed] the legitimate nonracial 
interests permitting considerable local control and accountability in educational matters,” 
but the court did not explore the rationales behind local control, nor did it consider the 
ways in which cross-boundary remedies might harm the “legitimate nonracial interests” 
behind it.243  Like Fischel, therefore, the Sheff court offers an incomplete framework for 
thinking about the benefits and harms of local autonomy alongside strict school district 
boundary lines. 
Realizing the goal of high quality public education for both city and suburban 
dwellers requires adequately addressing the roles that both local control and cross-
boundary remedies need to play.  The Connecticut legislature recognized this fact in 
addressing the question of remedies to the Sheff lawsuit.  It neither dis-established local 
school districts nor required suburban districts to accept an unlimited number of students 
through Open Choice, but instead proceeded incrementally to create cross-boundary 
remedies that preserved an extensive amount of local control. 
 
(ii) Lessons from the Tiebout/Fischel Model on Political Viability 
Its normative flaws aside, the Tiebout/Fischel model provides a useful framework 
for exploring the sources of actual or potential opposition to the expansion of cross-
                                                 
243 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1288. 
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boundary school choice programs, and for predicting whether or not they will garner 
sufficient political support.  For the reasons explained in the previous Subsection, the 
literature suggests that these programs will meet opposition.  Applying a Fischel-like 
model to the question of open enrollment programs like Open Choice, James Ryan and 
Michael Heise contend that suburban residents are largely satisfied with their local public 
schools and do not favor a vast expansion of school choice options at taxpayer 
expense.244  Suburban residents will resist the implementation of cross-boundary 
programs, they argue—particularly those that enable low-income, urban students to 
attend suburban schools—on the grounds that such programs threaten “the physical and 
the financial sanctity” of those schools.245 
However, an examination Connecticut’s experience suggests that additional 
attempts to implement cross-boundary programs will not meet the same level of political 
resistance that had met past attempts at large-scale residential integration.246  New 
Haven’s Open Choice plan has expanded steadily since its inception in 1998-99, from 
160 participants in its first year to 480 participants in 2006-07;247 Hartford’s plan has 
surpassed 1000 students, expanding by 178 seats from 2004-05 to 2005-06;248 and 
Bridgeport’s currently has 207.249  As discussed earlier, the number of open enrollment 
plans nationwide has continued to expand, and to expand services for low-income 
students, in spite of the structural and political limitations to such programs’ 
                                                 
244 Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2045. 
245 Id. 
246 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
247 Open Choice Data, supra note 86. 
248 Letter from Betty J. Sternberg, Commissioner of Education, to Chairpersons of Local and Regional 
School Boards in the Sheff v. O’Neill Region et al., July 19, 2006, available at 
http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/circ/circ06-07/c-1.pdf (noting expansion in Hartford for 2005-06 and 
2006-07) (last visited May 5, 2007). 
249 Cooperative Educational Services: Open Choice, supra note 100. 
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expansion.250  Implementing cross-boundary school choice options may in fact be more 
politically acceptable than attempts to implement residential integration through the 
elimination of exclusionary zoning, because the latter combines sentiments of financial 
self-preservation with a particularly potent racialized view of neighborhood quality, 
specifically the white anxiety about living with African-Americans as neighbors.251  If 
suburban residents do not perceive Open Choice programs as offering the same level of 
threat to neighborhood quality, but only a marginal, diffuse, and uncertain threat to their 
home values, they may be less inclined to mobilize politically to stop such programs from 
being created. 
Open Choice may also pave its own way.  It has the potential to continue to 
expand slowly as it closes the gap between suburbanities’ perception of the program as 
threatening a feared minority “influx” and the realities of bringing urban students into 
their schools.252  Indeed, as discussed above, even at small numbers Open Choice helps 
expose suburban students to a range of diverse classmates, accustoming parents and 
students to having larger numbers of black attendees in their school and paving the way 
for its own future expansion.  By facilitating the advent of a critical mass of black 
students in a suburban community, Open Choice may even facilitate an increased 
                                                 
250 See supra notes 55, 92-93 and accompanying text. 
251 See Berry, supra note 39, at 258 n.5  (quoting NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 167 (1994)) (“Citizens are also interested in zoning for its power to exclude African 
Americans, not because African-Americans are poor, but simply because they are African-Americans.”); 
id. (noting Tiebout’s acknowledgement that residents’ preferences “will include noneconomic variables” 
including the desire “to associate with nice people”); see also ELLEN, supra note 42, at 2-8 (arguing that 
whites prefer to move into neighborhoods with few blacks because they view a significant black presence 
as a proxy for a declining neighborhood). 
252 See Liu & Taylor, supra note 4, at 804, 810-11 (explaining that suburban districts are frequently initially 
reluctant to participate in an open enrollment plan but once they participate, the example of St. Louis 
suggests that they will find participation valuable and generally continue to participate). 
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openness among African-Americans to consider the community a desirable place to 
locate, and among the community to have African-Americans locate there. 
Even if opposition arises to programs like Open Choice, however, programs that 
allow suburban students to attend magnet schools in the city should not engender the 
same sorts of opposition, because these programs do not threaten the physical sanctity of 
suburban schools.  Ryan and Heise argue that suburban residents will oppose even this 
form of school choice, as it directs revenue away from suburban schools towards city 
schools, threatening the financial security of suburban schools and the link between local 
taxes and spending.253  But Ryan and Heise do not take into account that suburban 
residents who want to participate in choice plans will likely support making such plans 
available.  As discussed in Part II, African-American suburban residents in the New 
Haven region, compared with other New Haven-area suburban residents, are particularly 
likely to participate in interdistrict magnet schools.  In a given region, therefore, African-
Americans may provide a suburban contingent of support for such schools.  Furthermore, 
interdistrict magnet schools may find an unnatural political ally in those who wish to 
maintain a significant white population in the inner suburban public schools, since the 
departure of suburban African Americans from the public school system in favor of city-
based magnet schools may help to stabilize or decrease the rate of racial population 
change in the suburban public schools.254 
                                                 
253 Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2045. 
254 As discussed in text accompanying notes 196-197, following a period of steady increase, the percentage 
of minority students in the New Haven and Hamden high schools stayed roughly constant for several years 
after the interdistrict magnet schools opened their doors to suburban students.  Though the rate has started 
to rise again in recent years, it is clear that were it not for the magnet schools absorbing a slightly greater 
number of minority students from Hamden and West Haven each year, that the rate of increase in the 
minority student population in those towns would be higher.  Furthermore, closing the magnet schools 
entirely would almost certainly result in a spike in the minority population of the West Haven and Hamden 
schools as magnet school attendees returned to their home districts’ public schools, so even those who may 
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 Ryan and Heise may misperceive support for cross-boundary remedies in part 
because they treat the suburbs monolithically.  Though they acknowledge that there may 
be meaningful differences between inner and outer-ring suburbs, they nevertheless 
contend that variations among individual suburbs are not meaningful as compared with 
variations between the city and suburbs.255  Crucially, they claim that “many suburbanites 
select the suburbs precisely because they wish to separate themselves from urban 
residents and urban problems, which presumably predisposes them to oppose efforts to 
link urban and suburban schools.”256  In lumping suburbs and suburban residents 
together, Ryan and Heise do not acknowledge the fact that suburban African-Americans, 
who today constitute a significant percentage of the residents of the inner suburbs in 
many metropolitan areas, may have different political interests than their white 
counterparts.  As the number of African-Americans continues to rise in certain suburbs, 
residents of those suburbs will likely continue to increase their participation in and 
support for cross-boundary programs. 
Additionally, though white students participate at disproportionately low rates in 
the interdistrict magnet schools, the fact that some participate at all reflects an increasing 
willingness on the part of some whites to send their children to predominantly minority 
city schools.  Though both Open Choice and the interdistrict magnet schools could pose 
fiscal challenges by a) diverting suburban resources from suburban schools to the city 
magnet schools; b) diverting suburban resources from suburban residents by spending 
suburban money on city students attending suburban schools; or c) diverting city 
                                                                                                                                                 
have supported the programs originally on the assumption that they would stabilize the rate of minority 
population indefinitely would be unlikely to withdraw their support now. 
255 Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2048-49. 
256 Ryan & Heise, supra note 34, at 2049. 
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resources for suburban residents (in the case of suburban students enrolled in the magnet 
schools), these challenges can be met through strategic deployment of state funding to 
mitigate these financial harms.257  Finally, though open enrollment programs do threaten 
exclusivity of access, the structural limitations of such programs and fact that there 
remains a practical ceiling on slots ensures that access to suburban schools should remain 
sufficiently exclusive as to preserve the premium that good schools provide for the home 
values in a given area.258 
 
(iii) Financial and Political Expense 
 Cross-boundary programs are quite expensive to fund,259 and thus may crowd out 
the political palatability or funding for other types of potentially successful alternatives. 
                                                 
257 See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text (discussing the complex funding formulas for the 
interdistrict magnet schools and Open Choice).  Fischel himself acknowledges that targeting extra public 
school funds to low-income families with children, which they could take with them to the districts in 
which they attended school (a sort of “Tiebout voucher”), would give communities a greater incentive to 
accept low-income residents. FISCHEL, supra note 234, at 279.  Fischel would not, however, apply his 
voucher to permit interdistrict choice, because he argues that for the voucher system to work, it could only 
be accepted by public schools that those with the voucher would otherwise be able to attend (i.e., based on 
their location of residence).  To do otherwise would sever the link between homeownership and education 
that keeps even childless voters interested in school quality. FISCHEL, supra note 234, at 279-80.  Perhaps 
Fischel is right, but given that Open Choice attendees only make up a small percentage of those attending a 
suburban public school, it seems that general Tieboutian dynamics would not be much upset by the 
program.  See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
258 The Open Choice program in New Haven remains oversubscribed, and though the number of slots has 
increased over time and pressure remains on suburban districts to participate in greater numbers, in practice 
suburban districts retain the discretion to decide how many slots are available in the program.  For the 
2006-07 school year, fewer than 2% of New Haven school-aged residents participated in Open Choice; 
Open Choice participants did not represent more than 2.4% of the total students in any of the thirteen 
receiving districts, and constituted fewer than 1% of the total in eight out of the thirteen. Data calculated 
from Connecticut 2005-06 District SSP, supra note 45; Open Choice Data, supra note 86.  These small 
numbers may reflect funding limitations and a desire to not expand too fast, but they may also provide 
support for Fischel-esque reasoning that suburban districts will calibrate their “natural limit” of the number 
of slots they offer urban students below the point at which they believe making slots available will overly 
threaten exclusivity of access. 
259 A particularly significant cost is the long and costly hours of busing that the programs entail for those 
crossing district lines.  A few participants in Open Choice spend up to four hours per day on a school bus. 
Interview with Carolyn McNally, Program Development Director, Open Choice, and Lynn Bailey, Open 
Choice Coordinator, in North Haven, Conn. (Nov. 15, 2006).  As discussed above, state law provides for a 
transportation grant of up to $2,100 per student per year for Open Choice participants and also makes 
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In Connecticut alone, these continually expanding programs have incurred significant 
costs at the state level: 










































The magnet school figures include direct state funding to magnet schools, including 
operating grants and transportation grants, but they do not include construction grants or 
costs directly paid by the sending or receiving districts out of locally raised revenues.261  
In the 2005-06 school year, statewide approximately 14,790 students participated in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
supplemental funds available to cover transportation costs above this amount.  See supra note 88 and 
accompanying text. For the interdistrict magnet schools, transportation grants have accounted for about 12-
13% of the annual state funding these schools receive. CONNECTICUT STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
supra note 97.  This sizable portion of the total funding includes only the transportation costs of out-of-
district attendees, since host districts must provide transportation for their own students. See CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 10-264i(a) (requiring state to give town of student residence actual costs, up to $1,300 per student, 
for transporting or providing for transportation of students to interdistrict magnet schools in another town); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-261l(f) (requiring districts housing interdistrict magnet schools to provide 
transportation to students resident in that district on same terms in which it provides transportation to other 
public school students). 
260 Connecticut State Department of Education, State Funding for Open Choice and Interdistrict Magnet 
Schools, supra note 98. 
261 For a detailed discussion of how interdistrict magnet and Open Choice funding operates, see supra notes 
79-91 and accompanying text. 
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interdistrict magnet schools and 1,710 participated in Open Choice.262  Assuming that 
funding grew at similar levels as in previous years, the per-student costs to the state are 
approximately $6000 per Open Choice participant and $5200 per interdistrict magnet 
school student.263  This funding is likely to rise; Governor M. Jodi Rell recently proposed 
significant increases in funding for interdistrict magnet schools and Open Choice.264 
 Cross-boundary programs compete for funding with charter schools.  In many 
other states, urban public school innovation has focused on charter schools, which seek to 
replicate private school successes of small class size and individual attention, but 
generally do not emphasize integration.265  Though results have been mixed, in the past 
decade, a few networks of charter schools particularly well-endowed with human and 
economic capital, like the networks of school run by the Knowledge is Power Program 
(KIPP) and Achievement First, have achieved a feat previously thought impossible—
dramatically improving the environment and academic achievement of inner-city black 
school children without desegregating their environment by either race or social class.266  
These results have helped undermine the long-standing gospel among many liberal 
school reformers—including the plaintiffs in the Sheff lawsuit—that urban educational 
reform was not possible without integration.267 
                                                 
262 See sources cited supra note 100. 
263 I could not obtain the 2005-06 state funding levels. 
264 See GOVERNOR M. JODI RELL’S COMMISSION ON EDUCATION FINANCE, supra note 90, at 2-4. 
265 See supra note 229. 
266 For example, of students at the much acclaimed Amistad Academy in New Haven, part of the 
Achievement First network of charter schools, 83.7% received free or reduced lunch in 2005-06, and the 
school has a combined black and Hispanic enrollment of 97.4%.  Yet on the 2006 Connecticut Mastery 
Test (CMT), Amistad Academy’s black students outperformed the statewide average for black students by 
162% in math, 54% in reading, and 81% in writing, while Amistad’s students receiving free/reduced lunch 
outperformed the statewide free/reduced lunch average by 133%, 74%, and 71% in the same categories. 
Connecticut 2005-06 School SSP, supra note 100.  For more on the impressive achievements of KIPP 
schools, see EDUCATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 229. 
267 Emphasizing the precariousness and questioning the sustainability of high-achieving poor, segregated 
schools, however, many prominent civil rights activists—including Dennis Parker, one of the plaintiffs’ 
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Connecticut has also experimented with charter schools, beginning in 1996—the 
same year the interdistrict magnet schools began—and now has fourteen charter schools 
that collectively enrolled 2,693 students in 2005-06.268  Critics, however, have called its 
charter school law “weak”269 because of the stringent cap on the total number of schools 
and students and the meager funding the schools receive.270  Given the legislature’s 
emphasis on implementing the Sheff remedies over the past decade, a political focus on 
interdistrict magnet schools and Open Choice appears to have crowded out political will 
and resources to implement charter schools on a broad scale, at least until the most recent 
couple of years.271  Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate charter 
schools or to directly compare them to other forms of school choice, it is important to 
note the political reality that the massive financial and political resources required to 
                                                                                                                                                 
attorneys in Sheff—continue to believe that only with integration can progress for minority students be 
achieved. See, e.g., Speech by Dennis Parker, Director, American Civil Liberties Union’s Racial Justice 
Program, at Rebellious Lawyering Conference, New Haven, Conn., Feb. 24, 2007 (explaining that so-
called “miracle” schools often falter the moment a gifted principal or staff members depart, and are thus not 
sustainable as a long-term solution to the problems of urban education); see also Levin, supra note 156, at 
270-71 (noting that in part because of its segregationist history, national civil rights leaders have tended to 
fear school choice). 
268 See The Connecticut Alliance for Great Schools: How Connecticut’s Public Charter Schools Succeed, 
http://www.ctags.org/succeed.php (last visited May 8, 2007). 
269 The Heritage Foundation, Connecticut School Choice, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/education/schoolchoice/Connecticut.cfm (last visited May 6, 2007). 
270 Funding has been expanding in recent years.  The state funded charter schools at a per-pupil rate of 
$7,250 in 2004-05, $7,625 for 2005-06, and $8,000 for 2006-07.  Id.  The state board of education has also 
proposed doubling the number of charter schools and lifting the enrollment cap. Id.  Though the state did 
not fund charter school facilities or construction costs in the first decade of the program, a 2005 law, S.B. 
2002, provides $10 million for charter school facilities over a two-year period.  See id.  Though charters 
receive more per-pupil state funding than interdistrict magnet schools, the overall per-pupil funding levels 
for charter schools is much less because unlike magnet and suburban public schools, state-funded charter 
schools do not receive support from local tax revenue.  Prior to 2005, Connecticut Charter schools received 
no additional assistance for construction and facilities costs, though student transportation was provided by 
the local school district. See CONNCAN, ISSUE BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 3 & n.18 (2006), 
available at 
http://www.conncan.org/matriarch/documents/IB_Connecticut_Charter_Schools%282%29.pdf.  One study 
calculated that on average, taking all funding sources into account, charter schools received about $2,300 
less public funding per student than standard public schools. Id. 
271 See supra note 270 (detailing enacted and proposed expansion plans for Connecticut’s charter school 
program during the past couple of years). 
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implement a successful cross-boundary choice program will likely detract from the 
ability of a state to robustly implement charter schools or other forms of school choice. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 Questions of school policy are some of the most difficult that state and local 
lawmakers face.  Competing empirical studies, profound conflicts of values, paternalistic 
beliefs on education reform, and grassroots movements for education rights all meet in 
the high-stakes battle over how to ensure a successful future for the next generation of 
American schoolchildren.  Urban education has been a particular hotbed of conflict over 
the past several decades, as white and minority city residents alike have spoken out 
against public schools that they perceive as stagnant and unable to fulfill their children’s 
needs.  Since the late 1980s, a series of experimenters have sought to discover the 
panacea to urban education’s problems, or more modestly, at least solutions that work for 
some students. 
 Within this complex mess of policies, interdistrict magnet schools and open 
enrollment programs have tremendous experimental value, especially when deployed as 
part of a broader menu of choice options.  For all their difficulties—the expense of 
transportation, the difficulty of coordination, political resistance, the potential 
undermining of Tiebout dynamics, and their failure to achieve the integration their 
supporters expected—they offer distinct advantages to members of various races and 
income groups, particularly those who have been the subject of present and past 
disadvantage in our society, as well as for society more broadly.  Though these programs 
fail to achieve school integration in the way envisioned by their original proponents, they 
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do create positive momentum around a new type of school located in the city, with 
benefits for city and suburban residents alike.  They enable low-income and minority city 
residents to attend high-quality schools in a socioeconomically diverse environment.  
They provide African-Americans—including those who choose to move to the suburbs—
the opportunity to send their children to a well-funded, socioeconomically diverse, 
predominantly black school.  And they allow all participants to attend schools with 
greater levels of socioeconomic and racial diversity, providing benefits to students across 
class and race lines. 
This paper has demonstrated the unique benefits cross-boundary school choice 
options provide to African-American families in suburbia.  By giving suburban black 
families the opportunity to maintain their connection to the city’s black community 
through sending their children to city schools, cross-boundary programs help those 
families gain the benefits of suburban living like safe neighborhoods and nicer housing 
stock while retaining connections to the urban black community.  Urban blacks benefit 
too, by being able to attend school with their suburban counterparts.  By facilitating black 
migration to the suburbs, these programs have the potential to help middle-class black 
families avoid having to make the potentially undesirable choice between remaining in an 
environment that lacks opportunity and sending their children to a school where they will 
be a token minority.  The programs also allow for intra-family diversity, in that they 
permit suburban families—white and black alike—to choose different publicly-funded 
educational environments for each child.  This is particularly important, because as 
Moving to Opportunity reveals, moving low-income teenagers to the suburbs doesn’t reap 
benefits for every child.  The interdistrict magnet schools provide an experimental field 
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from which to disentangle and better understand the role of neighborhoods and schools in 
fostering the well-being of minority teenagers. 
Civil rights activists who oppose voluntary choice schools on the ground that they 
do not offer truly integrated environments must contend with the significant numbers of 
black suburban families who have voted with their feet in choosing to send their children 
to the interdistrict magnet schools.  While suburban blacks attending school in the city 
may face similar long bus rides to city residents attending suburban schools through 
Open Choice, if those rides prove excessively burdensome they can choose to send their 
child to the local suburban public school.  Research on intradistrict magnet schools and 
Open Choice can thus help discover the conditions under which families are willing to 
tolerate longer bus rides in order for their children to attend a school they perceive as 
superior.  In the meantime, city residents benefit from having an easily accessible high-
quality school—a particular advantage given that low-income city residents are least 
likely to have access to independent means of transportation. 
Finally, even as they work to bring about educational equity for minority students, 
these programs provide an opportunity to test the policy waters and points of support that 
likely lie somewhere between the politically unacceptable (and highly disruptive) dis-
establishing of urban and suburban school districts on the one hand and the morally 
unjust notion of failing to address the inequities of city schools on the other.  Suburban 
homeowners who would not consent to the total undermining of the physical or financial 
integrity of suburban public schools may nevertheless, for reasons of moral justice or 
perceived self-benefit, be willing to commit financial and physical resources to cross-
boundary experiments.  The programs therefore provide the opportunity to assess where 
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exactly the Tiebout pressure points lie and to educate future policymakers about 
designing cross-boundary or other school choice programs in a politically palatable 
fashion. 
The danger remains that these programs will crowd out funding for charter 
schools or other innovative forms of urban education that can educate a greater number of 
students at a lower cost.  But charter schools also have weaknesses, and the fact that 
charter schools may ultimately be more economical than cross-boundary programs does 
not, in my view, justify smothering the rich field of study that the diversity of school 
choice programs operating across different states can provide. 
From a stew of different policy innovations, society cannot help but learn more 
about the ways that families of various races and socioeconomic backgrounds will 
exercise school and housing choice given increased options, and about the way that the 
exercise of choice may benefit every child’s education.  Furthermore, by providing good 
educational opportunities to African-Americans and a viable schooling option for those 
selected city and suburban whites who are comfortable attending a good school in a 
predominantly minority environment, the magnet schools provide a potential integrative 
opportunity that single-district forms of school choice do not.  Ultimately, having cross-
boundary programs can only move us closer to discovering the most worthwhile ways to 
ensure that every child has the opportunity to attend a high-quality school with a safe, 
productive, and beneficial learning environment. 
Appendix A
New Haven's Interdistrict Magnet Schools and Non-Magnet High Schools
Magnet High Schools Enroll WhiteHisp. Black AsianAmInd%White%Hisp %Black%F/R Lunch
Cooperative Arts & Humanities H.S 400 111 90 196 3 0 27.8% 22.5% 49.0% 54.5%
High School in the Community 323 93 82 145 1 2 28.8% 25.4% 44.9% 49.5%
Hill Regional Career H.S. 709 124 178 377 30 0 17.5% 25.1% 53.2% 54.3%
Hyde Leadership H.S. 203 22 27 152 1 1 10.8% 13.3% 74.9% 61.1%
Metropolitan Business H.S. 173 9 30 134 0 0 5.2% 17.3% 77.5% 57.8%
New Haven Academy 145 18 20 107 0 0 12.4% 13.8% 73.8% 60.0%
All Magnet High Schools 1953 377 427 1111 35 3 19.3% #### 56.9%
Non-Magnet NH High Schools
James Hillhouse 1222 20 111 1088 3 0 1.6% 9.1% 89.0% 70.1%
Polly McCabe Alternative (7-12) 42 0 19 23 0 0 0.0% 45.2% 54.8% 73.8%
Riverside Educ. Academy 184 6 50 128 0 0 3.3% 27.2% 69.6% 87.0%
Wilbur Cross 1814 192 799 797 25 1 10.6% 44.0% 43.9% 73.5%
All Non-Magnet NH High School 3262 218 979 2036 28 1 6.7% #### 62.4%
Magnet Elem./Middle Schools
Barnard Environ. Studies Magnet 230 4 38 188 0 0 1.7% 16.5% 81.7% 66.5%
Benjamin Jepson Magnet 367 79 87 195 6 0 21.5% 23.7% 53.1% 51.8%
Betsy Ross Arts Magnet 505 114 140 246 5 0 22.6% 27.7% 48.7% 58.6%
Davis Street Interdistict Magnet 363 44 30 283 6 0 12.1% 8.3% 78.0% 48.5%
King/Robinson Magnet 408 16 31 357 4 0 3.9% 7.6% 87.5% 61.3%
MicroSociety Magnet 217 16 66 135 0 0 7.4% 30.4% 62.2% 56.7%
Sheridan Comm. & Tech. School 340 52 71 212 1 4 15.3% 20.9% 62.4% 57.6%
Vincent Mauro Math, Sci. & Tech. 391 31 182 173 3 2 7.9% 46.5% 44.2% 61.9%
All Magnet Elem./Middle Schoo 2821 356 645 1789 25 6 12.6% #### 63.4%
All Magnet Schools 4774 733 ### 2900 60 9 15.4% #### 60.7%
Appendix A
New Haven's Interdistrict Magnet Schools and Non-Magnet High Schools
All NH Non-Magnet Schools ### 1496 ### 7978 217 14 9.7% #### 51.5%
All NH Public and Magnet Schoo ### 2229 ### ### 277 23 11.0% #### 53.7% 61.7%
all figures are for the 2005-06 year and include both New Haven and suburban residents in NH Schools
Source: Connecticut State Department of Education, Connecticut Strategic School Profiles
